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FRO'>f Chief, Technical Int,,lligence Branch 
SUllJECT1 CIOS History 
L 'The attached hifltory of Ordnnnce-CIOS activities in t,he :<:TO in 
19L,4-19L,5: is not as satisfactory as I would i.- liked to have prepared it,.\···... .. · 
It is the best 1 could do, howev•or, without access to the files and records · . 
which :t, maintained in our London Office. ' !\• 
.2. Those files we,,·e requested of the Chief of the Technical Division, \~~-\ ·
Office, Chief Ordmrnce OJ'i'i"< r, three months ago, but will not arrive here '"" 
until aporoxima'cely March or April 1946. a/.L ~JL,. ....,,,........:.....,...(,, ~ .. '"" 
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Brigrldier General T .. T. Betts (U.S,A,), Chf'irmr:n, rrnd :·Ar, H.P. Linetend, 
Minietry of' Sup;ily (British), Deputy Chairmnn of eras, uteted on 15 Sept 45& 
MThe effective exploitRtion of Germ"n technical develooment h~HI 
proven one of the Bignificnnt results Mcruing from the conduct 
of the European War, The n.lue of the scientific knoY<ledge nnd 
'know-how' thu!l obtained ce.nnot riow be fully measured, The. t this 
intelligence contributed to the defeat of Japan ie well est~:bliahe1~. 
The benefits of this knowledp,e to British nnd U.S. ind1;atry will be 
measured in terms of economic progreas and well being for r11<1ny ye11rs 
to come, This record of achievement will prove ell the more in-
teresting when it is recnlled that prior to the fol'nia\\:rol'i' of CIOS, 
no planned s.nd ooordim1ted exploitntion of enemy technio,;l intelli-
gence w11a ever fl ttemoted, • 
The U.S. Army Ordnance Office cnn feel proud of ite valueble contributions 
toward mnking CIOS a auccea11, It wai; the first of th!! P:rmy Technionl ServJces 
to establish an org1mlztltion in the ETO prilllarily to make CIOS inveetigstions 
atld it had more investigators in Germany in the Spring of 1945 than eny other 
single member agency of eras. Becauae of its wide representation on CIOS 
Working Pflrtiea nnd ns \l, s. organizere for many of the Black Lie.t 1rnd Crey 
Liet Item~1, the Ordmmce Depe.rtment contributed much toward the fundnll!ental 
op6r~ ti on of' CIOS. 
Ordn.~nce furni<ih"'! a totlil of 119 technical inveuti.ge,tore trhich v-ere, 
11. t ve.riouti times, nent to German t•,rg6ts through the sponsorship_ of CIOS • 
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CJ0.S ;·1r1.r1toJ l:.i:;'.:r·:i:Ki:il:.tely 300 t.< .. rge•t :re;lorti>. '!'fie) Ordnnnce De".:1:: ... r t,:·: t~ ~~ t, 
inventigatorB preprtred 262 Target Hoports, most of ~·hicl1 ..,.ere printed by 
CIOS, the balanc<1 by FIAT. Theae figur,1i: are ev.idence of the large p1;rt 
which Cr,:nunce contributed townrd CIOS investigRtior16 of Germe.ny. In 
addition, Orclrmnce investif;otorii prepttred 113 Progreer Re·1orts (See l\'Opendix 
(A) for 11 list of the subjectli of thOfle Target and Progrees Reoorts). 
A Target Report iH the reoort ?1\tich thE> technica..1 investigP.tora (Field 
Teem) prepc,red and cont11inr. the results of their investigi\tion of one target. 
These re1Jorts are sometimes referred to as FINt1L Reoorte or CI0:3 Re1iorts. 
II. ?rogres11 .Renart is n report prepared by an Ordmmce-CIOS inventign.tor 
e.nd contains the results of invaotiV"' tiona into one phase of German technical 
intellir:ence; e,g. 1 Small Arms Trt1.cer Bullets, !Ugh Explosives or Manufacture 
of Steel Cartridge Cases, These reporta were r;lso referred to M Sub.)ect 
Reoorts. Many of the1.m rerorts were print"d by C108 11s Final ReportEJ becauoe 
of their general interest. Most of them, however, were prep!ired by the 
Ordn!ince Staff Organization in London, 'nd sent dir,,ot to OCO-Washington to 
advise of the progreFl!l of investigi,tions into n particular subject. 
It. is probably a fact tho t never before in recorded history, ha~ s 
defeated nation been so thoroughly investigated politically, industrl.nlly 
and ec1entific~.lly or been the source of 110 much vnluable technics1 '''. ··. 
intelligence 11s has Germmy. Tons of reports hPve r;een, llnd are Btill 
being• written on the re1mlt11 of such inveetiw'· tion11. Hundred11 of tons of 
technical Gormnn documeutc heve been, and remain to oo, tranale.tad, All of 
this informE.tion wae obtained by the V!!lrioua Services and Government. agenciee 
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The follovi-inc are fl rev: brief rth:tghl.iv,hts'1 of tho 0 finda" whic~h Ordnnrtce 
investlgn.torn ob:tain,;cl or nssisted in obtnininf.( through their investJ1<1<tion 
of Germ"n technict.1 intelligence. For convenience, tho lii1t i~ cll!sidrfoct 
to corre:; pond to the variouB Sact:Lqns in our London Office organizn ti on. 
A, Automotive 
l. Generali lnvestige,tion of the Germ"n automotive dev1•llopment program. 
revea.led that the effort wa.s nlmost oxclusi.vely conoentr8ted upon 
nrruorod fighting vehicles to th.., exclusion of regulE>r motor trnns:lort. 
Continuous imµrover.1ente Were m;;de .i.n tbe engin<is, power trains 1 rctnning 
g•mr, nrmor ><nd r..rmament of tankll and gun-ruotor cnrriagos, In nddi t.l.on, 
11 series of super-heavy tf1nks, t1 clime of eelf-propelled weapons :mown· 
ns the •Wnffentraeger•, and a new eeriee of tl!nke called the •E• seriae, 
were under development, es well fl~ rigid mdunting of tank gu.ne 1 imd 11. • 
gas-turbine 11pplication for 11 tank power plant. An outline of ther1e 
projects follo"'BI 
.2. ll:nginoa 1 . Com!idernble pruisur" wre e exerted from e bove on the Oerm1m 
engine designers to produce an air-cooled diesel t.11nk power phnt. A 
number of 11.ttl'llllpts were made to fulfill thi~ requirement, out the only 
significant engine development was the !foybnch Ht.2J4 gaa0line injection 
engine which hStd successfully pnsaed development teBts in which <JOO 
hormepol!er wns delivered~ 
.3. Power Trninei Germitn activity nlong these lines ha.d not.met with notable 
succetJa, Blthol'<gh n conaiderable :;irogr1im wa~ uncover<:id. Electric drive 
hnd been tried nnd found lacking in reliability, Improvements in 
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fli:-:.L-pl1!1ontion in con~~truction and o;)arr. ticn.. 'lurbo or to1·cuo con-
varter drive wa.u Hctivaly under davelo\:.:nnor1t ~!nd r.nfi> C<_inf.iider?~d the 
most oromisine for the high horue;,ower no;ilim•.ti.onf, 
4, Running G•mn Con~1ider,;ble effort WIJ.5 bein1; mvde ll.loni; the linon 
of iniprovini; the ride of Germen t1rnkB, and pro<iuoing lighter, sir:.nler 
and more effect.lve i;uspent<ions. Tbe progr£'1l! on s11spensions was 
closely tied in with the study of the problem of gunnery from fl 
moving vehicle with atabilizad line of si.,,h t, 
;. Armon InveatiiXH tion of the German armor producer11 and filhrlontors 
discloeed a. cons.iderably more advanced ~tr; te of t.he itrt than h1td be<'ln 
ll'-\P:>0sed from eX1J.lOlill1'. tion of r~quipment cn;Jtured during th~ war, S0sci-
ficntiona on the techniquea thnt were of interest T'ere obtained in 
mollt caflllllil, one of theme being the welding of the thick sections of 
· armor uaed in the Tip;er nnd the later super-he"vy V.n\.:s, 
6, Armi:ment& Arm11m1:mt projeota of interirnt included the rigid mounting 
of the 75 and 3Smm guns, the development of 11 gyrol!oopicttlly 
stnbili~ed line of r,ight, the "Kugelblitz8 anti-aircraft armored 
turret and the l.6 meter rangefinder inflttill1.1tion in the new ftnBll 
turret for the Ptmther. 
7. Super Heavy Ta.nka,a The pilot model of the F,,-.100 tank llma loo!'\ ted ~nd 
lAyout drawings of' the important naserobliee were obtn:l.ned. Thia tFnk 
wall designed to weigh about 100 metric tons, mount, a 150mill gun1 end 
he.va a i:loping front pl1,te ebottt eight inchat' thlck, An. even her: Vi Jr 
tank hnd been conGtructed 1rnd te~ted 1 known n~ the "Mou~e•, nnd 
lllounting the eamo t1u·ret, but weighing 200 !letrl.c rom;. Compl~te 
en1.:ineeri.n1; de ta Wll.6 obtrdm'd on the "Jo1l1"'", t:at thf' >•ilot rr.crdel N1Si 
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e. Tj"< ,..~ i11>-: r:_ f. /\'1 ~1 !: r f' ~~~::;L.; :'·,· :,~t.· '"'t• ,i· t. r'un-:r.~}tor r.::.:r1·:i,'·.;".·": e1·::1.~c 
known ns the 11 Wnffentri.e.?"J1" 11 vu.,·~~ fy}i;\;:~ plr,.nned ~-, t tri~.:. en.C:. o~·· the ., ··r. 
Thero 'Ne.rfil tn 'be tv10 'bacie chn&;t<lF, lirshtly crr.c.crnd, 11f.1.~ed 011 tile 
Pz JBT oomnonont.F, mou.t~tin? n~rm.~~1 fi.Blr~ nrtillwr;r. ?!.~,:.1vir:,ion::.'· 
originr~lly were ror.do ftil' damount1ng ~~·~o ·,.::tlr·tpon!) tt~.' ~~Il !~lterr1~tive 
firing poui ti on, but this roquire"t'3nt wo r ":i11ndoned. Thie, program 
Wt<.fl considered to be ran artillery <hw·alopm.,nt not f1,vored by tha 
rarmored force, •~nd Wt<!l mi1inly f<n e:qmdiont to produce na much !'ire-
power n!l poar·ibla wi tll the exinting renouroee. 
9, "E• Series Tt1.nksa The "E" series of t.Hnki; was the lo test thinking of 
the Heereswaffenamt, 1md included the E-10, tho E-25, the l',,-50 rind the 
E-100, The nu.ml:>E•r& repreeent the est:l.Jnrctfld wei•.:hte of the b11sio 
oh!<Sllill, ·The firat two, upon· which very little inform.,.tion has al!! 
yet been discovered, were conaidared tc be the most µromiainr, end 
repreiiant the return of the Garmrm tank deoign trend to lighter nnd 
more nnauvvrllble umk11. 
lO.Gtla Turbine Power Pl:::nt& Potenti1.;lly ths most, important sin;.tle 
de•alopment thnt h1<e been discovered i~ the work that hitd been done 
upon the a;,plicl'ltion of the gas-turbine for use all 11 tank power 
plant. i\n increase of 30% in power inut1.1llecl into e. given siae engin<• 
compartment woe predicted, with tlV<.mtually no poorer :fuel economy 
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B. Ammunition 
l. In th~ f.i.l\tld of prop&llnn t~i, the u,tsa of tn:~GDN ( dia tl1ylnrio r~l~/col. 
dinil;ra te) wa& known from the e.nnlysis of on p tur<id sam11l1~1:. lnv<>"-
tig11 t1.on baa r'lVe~.led th«t tilia d11velopment, origin11lly bM;ed 'rn a 
:eeitroh for an "Er•atll" mntetr1al to meet en antiaip>1ted ahortoge of 
NG (ni troglyaerin), gave rise to powder oomnon1 t.ionii having both 
det:1ir!!.bl'.! iuanufncturing chnraatori!ltias and, in 11ervioe, 011uaing 
l1ttrn gun tube erosion t.him NG powder, Rebtive to NG, thfl hi~her 
volatility of J)EGDN was unde11ir,nble. Th:l.a led to the further 
develoµm,,nb of' 'l'EGDN (tr:l.ethylene glyool di.nitrate) and Rotriol for 
Ulle in powder oompoHit:l.ons deetined fo:r tropiceil service, 
;;:. rtith rr;g«rd to hivh <txplotiivea 1 it ill probmbly 011 :moiit significance 
th11 t no !H1$0ntially nsw compounds were f\mnd durin11; the oourae of' 
, the inves t.:\.ga t1om1, It viae di1;cov;i:red th& t hexogen develof)'.11on t and 
manufact.ure w11s undertaken to provide n eubet1tute for TNT h;ao11um:t 
of t.he potant.inl row materials fox· hexogen mrmuf~:cturo '!'ere pe.rticu-
larly well sui t.ed to the Germm economy. From invcntign ti on it 
se.,me remsonetbly cert.,, in t.'iHt the Germ~n hexow.in dovelopm<int. w~s qui ta 
independ<llnt of th~:t tn the U.S., C1mnda end Uie U.K. However, it ill 
of inter"f't to note thnt the G'Jrnw.n '~ork follo\fed a nnr!!llel course 
and reached 11bout th" sm::e point of t.achnologicttl ap;Jlicntion. 
C. Artillm-y 
l.. Th~ .tr.var. t).gi:1. ti\)Di5 0 r 1.~~~l·:nHn 1:,rtillory ,-:ov\'3lt."H)iil•'·n i~[; ::.i.:~dt~ 1'<> t!;.\ tH 
x·~yv~~nl thnt --·,\lthcll.<~r; thi:)it~ crt:..llcry --_~f~fli~::nE ·;Jere nu.ch ~'-~: to ,;,~i\,.~ 
most of their wet~uons ~uperi()r.i t~./ in :·1erf;.Jr:ru1nce over th.•) C':?:1r0~·t 
6 
l~ 
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c.. ~um~) ble CHrtrid~re CflPEtffl Th~ Gormcnn war~ well ~lonm: with 
t.tie dovelopm<0nt of such o 011rtriov,o ct100, t,he 11mny etdvonto.ges 
of which nN! reed.Uy ll'>Parant onrtioulc.rly when ugad for "'ir-




dat,a on thrn development of thh type of Cftl!e and will be 
pre"ented when ~vnilabla. 
d, Douhl'!,~il Carr1.ngaa1 Alinoat l\l.1. 1"ew mecl:l.ure Mnd h<i>avy fidd 
f'i . .,l<l carriP.gos of' Germ~n develoj)tn<1nt •11ero goin~: to the use of 
double r1•ooil typ'J Ollrrhig111:1. 'l'ha over-nll ndvrcntag!Oe in per-
forruance to be gein•ld by ;;uch a <H1rr1"1;<1J nre ''lenr cut i.wd l.n-
disputabl!;, Th<Hlfl 11dvantv.;;a,; h11VH long be'm touted in the Bt>d,ea, 
Thti fact thu t the GermRtW were nbout to Uf'" thill type cnrri~.ge in 
moat nll of' thoir :nediu.m and h"''V:I field weaponri should provi.de 
an r;dditiontll nrgument for its use in any furth«r firtHlery 
developraent,s conducted in the Gt,,; tea. 
e. R~caill&SP. Guns& Tho a~rmr.n~~ h~d ft compr1:llhon~iv0 d1-iP/~\10('~Bnt 
protr.rnm 11ndar \1'8Y t~or thiz ty;J1~·.1 of wa~~ pen. They r4~co~n~.%ed. 
cl<mrly the mnny dia11dv1•:n tiw<1s of aueh " w<i<:.f'(lrl ft'r ''~sld use 
but conaiden1d U:"t fc•r speciHl :iur:.io~""' in the !'<.e!,,! the develop-
illent of n comj)lt~t.f~ lin~ nf' {J,uch wt.,rltiOnE~ t1r.t1 ,juf't.1.1'1.o<~.. There 
groi:teut intereFt Jn t.hi4 t·/:'te "H:~Hnon, huwev11.r, lr .. ~v !Ln :\."ta n·;.l~·)li-
o~ ... tion ~t~1 r;ircr.~1ft (,r;~nr.1ent, ""l";8r•:i thfl mr~l-t.,f"fBr,ts of bf\Ck 1.".ll!'.gt 
Cl~n l)~ minjs.n1.ze1i r-r~d '--'ho~·~ thr~ nf'ivr.int~;r,~et "thf'•-1_ ~O!r,•.; 00.r'-<:~ '::ith 
orthodox dE}Bit:;ns of .vuns e~_nd rockott:1; i.,041 li:;ht weir.;ht fj.nd. ~~ood 
<l.<~Ctlrr~cy·, t:trt~ optimum. It .1 rp~)(J.7'.!'1:\"d to he th1:iir ).ntention to <:ffoct 
1°c:."i,;n.-.~:u.r:..;;_in.: 1 t ,.;f t,br .::i'.!." .•;ircrt·~:"t by \-J~':'ir.iloyin;< :t't'.Ct 1 ill~."t.l~3 i::-u.nH 
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f.. Super-Heav'\' Hnd ~1un~l.C 1Lonr_~-Rr1n;rr) nunr'.: 
thin clnssifioa.tion >1ppenr to be, in the m~in, a waete of' tin1.,, 
effort and money. Thi>' opinion h11c been corrobora tod 1.n almot>t 
every instance by -0.n.ch sober Germm engimier with whom these 
we1rpons have been diricussed, l t iE> felt that the Ord.r:1rnce 
Department should avoid gettin€ it~elf embroiled 1n any develop-
men ta of. this type as lon1\ as there exist other, more economloal 
menn!l for obti;ining simili;r results nt the target. 
g. Automatic Cannons Th.; Gerr.wns ere con~ider"d to b0 considenbly 
ahead of us in thic fio ld by way of detniln of design and variety 
of ·netlponi: •. Prollably, thi:o it< fl•.) only beo~.uce of the gr••n ter 
effort th<it th~iy ;JUt, into tr.io field, The only baoicBlly new 
prind.ple thut thay hod o;i?lied tlrn.t doe~ not opp<1P.1r in our 
we1qJons j,a thn t of using de~igns which permit very .;ixpeneive 
manufncturing proc.odurn y,•itho'.l~ sacrificinf~ 9erfor1nnnce. The Inor .. t 
not11ble sinff,le prectice 1llong thie line is their use of stomped >111d 
preuned purts for gun mechanism comoonents. Thie rnost cert1•inly d"-
serves our attention as the stwing in m11n houz·a nnd m~ terivls ie 
very great. 
2. In 11ddition to the P..bove, nr,eful informr•tion h&B been obtdnod on ~he 
aub.Jects of toroion find otlH\r ''Pring ausri,mPions for gun cnrringes, 
the }1ig.h-low preerouro ~01n, erosion, r.~un life find rotntin~: br •. nci def-~ign, 
and bnllintic ,:.-,nd wen.pons rr:il•~~Hrch. The :lri.:f'orm1t tion cbtr-.in~d on the 
subject!! -,,nl nl~o he ov1 .• ilc:hlc shorU.:r l.n reporte to bo pubU11hnd. 
I 
' ~' 
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D. Smnll Ar11e 
l. Sm1<ll ArinR investig1'tiorw were oon<lact,ed with ob,i<>otlve of obtaining 
1nforlllat1on of 1mmediat0 use to t.he 0ff!.ce, Chinf cf Ordnrcn""· f1ctu"l 
projacts will b" linted below nooording to subject, One ph;;.i;e of the 
· investign tion 'l<f!ll t.o detertnine why the Gl!lrwrnri U!l<Jd P. rl')ls tJ.v0ly lower 
velocity :tn their ldror,,ft weapons than w~.o our practice. It 0pp1H1ra 
that ~hey laid gret.'. ter importance on high cyolia rate, reasoning that 
for a oomparable inetnlln ti.on, Ii high velocity round rmuld \le lurger 
and heavi&r end thus reduce cyclic rlil te, Thia informll ti on is ba1Jed on 
vsrioua intervieYta and di2ous11ions and on the fact th!lt their 11H1t 
rei;e,,.rohea were directed toward super cyclic rates in the neighborhood 
of 20,000 to J0,000 rounds per minute. 
2. .lwunimi tiont The principle Corm1m actj.vi ties in Srrmll Armll Ammunition 
were directod alonr; two nmin lines& first the devolo9111ent imd .)roduc-
tion of steel cnae ammunition nnrl lat•~r, the development cf' improved 
electric primers. Stael caoe~ ware produced ~nd twed, a,lthou;:h they 
"ere not superior to those tn!lde in the :J,S. In moEt car,<rn they ''ere 
coated with wnx to improve extr,,,ction. P'.l'!lotric primers were used 
t.tn·ouu;hout the wnr. Thdr produotfon vm'' very <llfflcult, e:nnloyin;;: 
n lot of' IHrnd Mwembly opere. tions, and thtt t, tog" th er with tJie 
dePire to ltS·<l them in lre.rger cRliber ~hell led to nn "xtenei ve 
pr".::rr<'-11.l to rlevolop f.J. !nore ::=iati.ofa.ctory 01'H1. Gt:~rrr.t\.n OX~"lGri~~nCPf; 'N1'..~re 
similflr to th·~'tjB :i.n th~~ U.!). 1~nr:. u.~-~. r:..nd the :">rorr;~_r.1 ,,,,,, __ ,~, fiqt ccrnpl.:t.:7d 
n t tht:i end of' tho wnr. St'>me "frouk" projoct~1 ··':orf1 c::!.r:covr~r~Jd, euch us 
rocko t pro,i.,ctilee, poison bulli;·ts ~nd conllum~··, blo cu»•~, but no ,,vi.cience 
wus found Uwt v;ould :lnciic11te th"t theH• proj•1ct<: wnre c'wco1:cfiul or 
intonfivf.:-1:,.' 'JUl'~\\.L<·~(:.. ~~r>nr::.u.t:J~ b.:...\:·) enrn C~'-'.vnlo :m~"'nt V".~ ~· '."·':'''' 
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The Walther P38 was developed and l"rgely 11dopted because "f feeding 
difficulties with the Luger. Toward the end of the war !,le.user developed, 
. but did not produce, the Volkap1stole. This is a 9mm w110.pon m1tde by 
. shaping and a9p•>er11 to be reliable• oheap and e"ey to produce, 
4, Maohine Gunoi Devalop11ent of Infantry 1Jlllohins guns was clh"eoted toward 
speeding up and eal'ting of m1rnuf" oture, This faot is illustrated by llluoh 
wenponll na the MG 4;t, II(? 44 rmd FG 42, all of which made great use of 
sta111ped pnrte, At tho end of the vmr, Ma111ier wne developing nn iilmost 
1dent1onl copy of the Drit11iih St.en gun. The rlloat importnnt mechine gun 
developmenta were the 14auaer MG 213 and MO 215. Both h1>ve high ayclio 
rt1 te and comp.,.ra. ti vely high velocity. The MG 213 is 20mm caliber con-
vertible to JOmm und the MG 215 ia 13 or l5mm. Both ha.ve 11v,ht wai1:ht 
and will raa terially &id in meeting <)ur requireu1ent•i for a high speed 
caliber • 50 me.chine gun, a caliber .60 lllll.chine gun and a. 20mm C"<nnon. 
In an effort to combat bolllb&ra with high speed pursuit aircraft, mr1.chine 
guns with cyclic rates on the order of 20,000 t.o 30 1000 rounds per minute 
were under development, These guns fire very short bursts, and firing is 
:1.ni tih ted photo-electrically when the pl1me is in the proper position. 
The object of tha high rnte iii to li'y down a denoe ourtdn of fire from 
a very short rnnge. Two different methods 11era employed to ctttnin the 
high r1'ta. One W>tfl to \We a gun with rme curtri.dgo c;:~e which contitins 
from 7 to 9 pro,iaotiles. On ignition, the i'irnt ~rojectilc ii; fired rnd 
th0 r'rnul tttnt ;1raaRur0 drop cau~ee1 t.'1e next one to bo rotated in line 
with the bore R.nd then ;Jres:mro r,oer m> nncl flrei; tho 5•~cond one. The 
prcpellr:nt burn~? \ln1~i.l Hll proJ!:?Ct1ll')f-:· HrO 1 ':'.r«~d. i'h':J rJt,!·: 1:Lr r.v:>thod W~'-G 
to -~_:r:J<..~D te:u;'!ltbor aevorr~l Binr~le ~hot ;-?U!1~ ~--~·,d prr.~:r~:··:i, \li~ll1'lly i:~lsctr-i.~ 
cr,ll;r" ~ to firu t:u:•m in r1uccr.:nsic~1. 
ll 
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5. Hifles1 '.l'he mo~il notorious G<1rmt1u de"T<lloµment in tn .. fi"ld of rifle:< 
vms the curved be.rrel. Two crnrv9d barr!ll. a ttnohmantfl wer'l devoloµed 
and put into limited production. They are for u.ee with the MP 44! 
'' 
which llhoots the ahort 7.92ram cartridge. It will shoot a bullet. 
~O degreea from normal in the infant;ry adaptation and 90 degr .. 11>11 
from normal in the tank model. It conaints merely of a rifled lli;rrel 
bent to the proper angle and f1i.;tened to the g\Ul by a simpl<1 clamp, 
The Volk:vgewehere ill important only in thn t it ahowa how chaiip a r;l,flo 
can be me.de on a large scale 1md etill function. It jolto the avmrage 
person•e conception of the .quality required in 11 rifla. Two import.Int. 
production techniques were found. One ia "' 1nethod fo.- cold forging 
rifle barrels, eomple ta ·'11th rifling, on one raachine. 
\ ,' 
The other is ll. · 
barrel etra.ightening machine "'i tb a mechani.cnl optical ~:mtem which 
eliminates the hum~.n error and speeds up the proccrns. 
6, Gov<irnment agencies P.ncl proving ground had much lens influ@nce on 
wenpon '..!evolo\Jment th1m in the U.S. :ind U.K. ?rncti<:ally nll such 
s11it•ll arms work wrw dom1 b,, the three firrni~ of llheirnnet.all-florrig, 
Mi1.us1Jt'werke 1md Deu tache «iaffen nnd Muni tfonsfabrU:en. Th£H1e oon-
earns 1J.ppt..r•mtly h1,cJ. rm unlimited bw'.1.;'lt for their 'JX)JHri:ncnt.«l de pr; rt-
ments all they hml l\ we11lth of excellent eq«i;Jmmt t1.nd employed v;,ry 
able <:>ngineers and acientii;ts. It is :lntr.r·o: tinv to riote thn t t.hay 
ell gr'l1•.tly felt the lc;e,: oi' alloys t\nd hir;li r,rr.de steele in tlla 
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E. Miaceallt~neotu~ :!.:..''·tr.~~; 
1. Fuelil nnd L·..ihrl_cnnta1 Invo~t1gntion of :f>'ti<>ll' imd Lubricnnt1' tRrg•~ta 
in Germtmy yi"l(}ed comol••ta and Vb\lU11ble informMtim1 on the follo'1-
ing new nnd little known proce~ce~I 
a, l!~nuf»cture of high quality (e.vh ti,m) l11bricents from ethylene, 
b. Manuf1wture of !!.Utomotive lubricnnts from olefins (wax) 
c. Manufactura of aldehydas snd sulfonic aetar eol!lpt! frm.1 olafina 
by the new OXO proceirn. 
cl, M11nuf'e.cture of high Cetano Diesel t'uels over iron irnt11lyst,t1 by 
the Fiseher-Tropech synthe~is. 
e. Lit tei1t technique and eqll ipmen t used for the aucceu!'ful !il!mUff.u!-
ture cif hif'.h oct"ne fuel!; from coal hnd cor.1 t»r by hydro1conr,tion. 
f. Mimufncture of hi1rb qtmli ty, hl1~h aromatic content fuel by the 
ne"' nnd highly imporbrnt DMD pror:eas, 
:\ 
g. Lutent t~chnique unrl •lquipmont for the l.sonttr1zntl.on of butane 
or butylenes roquired in the :aenufucture of high Mt1rne fuel, 
h. T'<'.·o n'"" '.>rocli»1Bel:l for t.he mu.nufactura o!' t.oluene, i.e. methimol 
End benzene (V7"'-lcianburg) and by cycliz.a tion of heptitne (Rul1rchfJm1e,. 
i.. L'evelopttH}nt and ~1;1nufnct1tre of a new H.nd extremely at~ble greP.~Je 
cnllerl INV~ROI, uaaful in li:t1truraonto nnd fir<:0 cor\t:rnl 6l•.~'1inn:er,t. 
Th-J. Hnacific.\<.t.ion,. formul.:.'!tion n.ll/; utll1zntion n0 well ~~f.! dtr:5t..ributi~)n 
(~iIJ!t'J) of' ,(·.:r.ny \lermE:n mi:!.l t.D.r}r .fuelr; end lubricf1l'ltfs h~ivo {_1eon '.!btrrin~d. 
!5~t'.JL"!.l,:~f- of !.'lr<i.I'\'/ r1f the 'Lill'(>Ort::nt :Jr0c'.uetE 't'~r~ obtained f'.:ir fnll r:c.·-, le 
t~::!t,~; :lo. ::.cr,rica oclu:.po1~r1t. !'h'.1 fol.la···:in.q, new :-.~.BterinlF un;.:n ,,·r:l ch 
full l .b~:..r:. t·,~)r:.' :-r;_,_; :~n conH:! C'\f!GB :Jlunt r'1~:.nuf'e:cturln.rr !f.nf.: t.efit ,:et~~ilc 
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a. Product 891, dichlorodiphenyl-phM•1,horoua nctd wan Mld1tive 
for the lubricating oil used dur'lnt: Uv> bra~tk-in period of 
engines to eliminate rejects and reduce the brenk in time from 
70 to 20 hours. 
b, Bbhrmittel H additive was extremely uaeful in cutt.ing and drawing 
operations. 
c, KSE, RSO.zNHCH2COOR wae addi tiv" which httd wid" and useful aopli-
oation in corrosion reaiating Torpedo and hydraulic oils, 
d. Meaulfol 2 (R-O-C-S-ctt2)2 was extremely interee.tin~ high presoure 
additive dev,,loped for· use in "1aohine gun oil. 
e, Additive "H" was a tin compound which had remarkRble propertiB!l 
when used in aviHtion engine lubric11ting oila. The rin sticking 
time was more tlrn.n dnubled with 1 ts use, 
f, nyn Ar.le oil contnining 20% of .,,; tor E-502 and 80% "R" oil, 
allowed rail rond cnrn to be 100% overloar1ed wi.thout benr:lng 
failureri. 
2. Hubber: Investigation of Rubber Tr;rgeti; in Gernwny h1<!l yielded 
valunble infor:ill\ tion on the ma.nuf!lctare of IluM. Type Synthetic 
Rubbers 1md importnnt informr: tion on the omnuft>cture rend service-
ab.Lli ty of variouii products m!lde by the German Rubber Industry for 
War Tine Consumption. The inform . ., tion secured w"" of the "nllo.,'in:'' 
nn ture 1 
11. '.,1'n1Ufactur<'I 11nd f:c;cLm D8.k for 0 n1iurn1,tic Tire~ f:or \'illtr,ry 
end Civilian Vehicl9s, 
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o., Design a11d m.v.nufn.ct~!re of Buna Bogioa Rollers ~ttd ~rHckc Pr~dSoto 
d. Design and nrn.nui'ao ture of "Luka Reif en• tlrr.,, for oper" tlon 
'lfithout air. 
e, Design and mnnufaoture of' "Drnh tband-ll.eifen" solid tires 
which were demoun tP.ble uni ts 1n!tde wi tlJ011t i; teel base b1rndr'. 
f. Design r.nd m~.nufaotu.re of V bel ta, Conveyor Bel ts B.nd 
Tr~.nSr4ieuion Belta for Military use and for uCTe in Essential 
Industry. 
g. Design and manuf*Lcture of miscellnneoua rubber products such 
1i.r; rubberized fabrics, fuel cells "md technic"l goods. 
By inveotigation of the large~t rubber plants in Germvny, it was 
poirn:l.ble to oret o. b!tluncod picture of the thinking bahind the uEe of 
Euna S rublmr "nc'. the opinions aa to the aervi.cenbili t.y of products 
umde from it. It wrrn also learned the:~ !'lll product manufacturers 
found lluna i3 too difficult to work with and that their complnints to 
r.a. Fnrben-indu"trie had stimul1 ted work by the I.G. Re~enrnh Sta.t'f 
on improvementfl thnt would mnke Bunn of p,renter plnatici ty uvf>.il&ble 
som.,tiroe in the future, It wan found th"t the Physior!.l Tav.t 
Ln.bor,,.tories of the :.G. Fllrben-induotria in Leverkusen were v"1ry 
udvtmcod in tE1chnic;ue and Bf!U.ipment used to evalua to the :lystHres:l.o 
chrcr11ct.er of Synthetic Rubbors and thti.t by '1eHrn' cf th'.u; "turJ.y this 
letborHtory hnd fc;urld it j'Jo:Jsible to reduce the :n;:.;r~i:n of r~lffnrt.~r~ca 
bt':t·,-.1eon nRt)ll"'~~l rubbor und ~3ynthetic ru.bb.:·}r it'. t\e.~'-.t rl(~V~}lO~)ment, 
c.hB.ru.c tari$tics. 
l 'i 
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high grade adhesive for bonding rubbur to steel fabric or other 
me teriul, wan obtn ined. Thia inf orrrm tl.ot1 ah ~uld prove of mn ter:tnl 
'yalue to the Rubber Industry of' Allied Countrien for superior 11d-
hoeivan are the 11uhjeot ol' Continental sc~reh and if Desmodur R is 
oap1ible of most of what German so1entillts claimed for it, it will 
be in greP- t demand. 
Subsequent to the CIOS inveatign t.iomi of the Gerralln Rubber 
Industry, a eurvey was made of the performance of Bynthetic Rubber 
Products on U.S. Ordnnnce Vehial•m. Thia •<iii> &ooompl:!.11hed by 
via:l.ting Ordmmce Tire Hepair Dt•pots end Ordnance HeaV'/ \leinten1rnce 
Depots, F.xaept in the Tire HepRir Comp1m:l.Eile, moH t of the e:i..cporioncad 
personnel hnd been sent home on points but even so much eir:nl.fi<mnt 
inforrac• tion wes gathered thet should prove of "''lue to Ordnai:ae, 
This inv1mtiga tion covered the service on Synthetic Pneumn tic Tires, 
Bogie hollers, Tank Trnck Block:i, Inner Tubes, F1rn BeltCJ t•nd G11skets. 
;a. Plnatics1 The invel!tigRtion oi" plaeticB t"r~etll in Gerrnlmy ha.111 
yielded f1tirly complete devHlo;Jmen t •md '1!a.nufooturing inform'"- tfon 
on plRutioii of "ll typ•rn, ef.1neciHlly those "hich rec!lived Hoeeiel 
military anpliontion during. the '''"r· The nore imµortnn1; phasdln cif 
tllH invilf' t ign tions conc1<rm1d the f ollowin;' i te'"s 1 
~. 1,1oulding of 1,nrge ext.rR Htvength pnrts fr'"" !?olyvinyl 1\lcoholo 
type :ax1 t-r.:.irtn.ls. 
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b. 't''roduct.ion .and. une of polyethfiine in aevornl gr~deei .. 
c. The wide uue made of phenol. type plaetios inl!lida t.ubos 
lilnd tile mot:.lding technique to 11ccomplish thill. 
d. The use of poly ~tyrenes in f1izer1 bodies etc. 
e. The manufacture and use of hi.gh moleculnr poly ethylenfJ as a 
plastic in high frequency re.dio equiµnumt, submnrine telegrHphy 
and aa a film for tropio111l packaging. 
t. The development and manufo.ctura of "Luvitherru" 1111 a pn.ckl!Ring 
material for ui;e in tropical climates imch as were obt1J.ined in 
the P'ar Eaat war zone 
F. Guided Missiles 
l. The moot important 11ingle item aonoerned with rocketi< hiui been the 
uncovering of a large variety of highly developed guided mieailee 
in Ger1n1my. Tbeue miasilee may be pl.need in the follo•dnf( crktegoriena 
Ground - to - Ground 
Air-to-Ground 
Air-to-Air 
Ground-to-Air (An tia irora.ft) 
a.. Ground-t.o-Gr<'.'unrl Guided .1a1wiles1 Tho moat important of thot10 nre 
(l) A-4 (V-2). 'Xhb ia a liquid f1lel, r11d1.c controlled long-
ranve rocket. 
(2) X-7. c;olid fuel, wire-controlled, nntii:•nK rnc'rnt 
b. Ai r-t.o-Grc\1nd 1_:uid~~9 \liE.flile s: Th~ ;no::: t l:I1por t roc~~H t.r:1 in 
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Th" Air-to-Ground D1i1n:·il1'!ll .,.,, «ll crlowol.y :relMtod with:. 111.ight 
. 111od1f1cmt.iona trout on• model to the next. .Ul.. l!IOdelet' are 
: launohed (<!Id rl'ldio-oontrolled frrnr1 a purent 11U-or"1't. , They. !!!re 
e,:lllOst,generally employed ag~im1t other airOl'eft.. PropW.sion is 
, l,lu.ppl:l.ed by 111ellna of one or more liquid propulsion unite.· 
o •. Air-to-Air Guided lllis11ilas1 The most important rocket in this 
.. i:iltiJlfl! ilH j, :; : ~-
' 
" ' ' ;•.''. . c:··~.-
'"'.·i ' 
(l) X-4 -- Thia. 111 11 eolid, fuel, g12ided; micodle, l\uid1n« mAy 
, '.,be of. the: vedio type control or wire oontrol from ths launch-
ing aircraft. 
'· •· ~-, ;•,; i': (2) H11-2,98. -'.""" 1,'l'hl,.s millsils is somewhr.t like the Hs-117 




wire .control, gi;;iulcl be used, up to l 7km. It is propelled by 
solid t,ype,,~ocket fuel. 
Ground-to-Ai.r Guided Missilec1 The Grouni:J-to-Air :ni1rniles 1rre 
. en 1.ur.tr•~mely import,mt development "nd this f«ot w1w an;mrently 
renliaed by the Ger;.U!ru;, judging l:!y the time and effort ex-
. pended ou this ola:rn rif mi11siles. The more import8nt iniR;1Hes 





All ~.>.l'.'e lir;u.:i.':l fut~l ty c1•:; rtH~~'.·~t,:; t.rtd ;:r:: 1::~ 1..lnch d 
v~rtice.lly or ri. t f.ln Hr;gle. Th~ :Risr.'.il1:~~~ i·\re ~on tr0ll1;id fr."Jf.1 
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Operf!.tOr to guidt:a the :tlaoila to the tnrt;;-et. ifi:;rxri.C" r:aviC'E._~13 
and pro:i<iml. ty type fuzers for thaae mi1J8ilee ware l\l.•cc' tn u 
hir,:h state of devc.1lopm,,nt. Tho Gera"na cmlculr·ted thllJ!!;, "'i th 
lllillS.ilea of th.is type, they could bng at lee.at one er:<mty 
bomber with not more thnn two (2) miai<ilev, 11 very r"lason1able 
assumption~ 
fhe project o.f: guided :niasilee. in G(lrt11my "'It@ highly developed aml had 
they the time and faoili tieB t.o o:mtinue with this work, th>it reaul ts 
of air warfare might h1<Vti been entirely ahangod. 
Q, Metallurgy 
l. Sintered iron rotei.ting bands 
2. Steel cartridge cmaes 
J, Rolled steel c11rtridga 011sea 
4. Improved oemen ted carbide cutting tools 
5. Cernmic cutting toola 
6, Ceramic-powdered met.nl turbin<> bltules 
7. Electric smelting furnace for product.ion of pig iron 
S. 50,000 ton farginr; press 
9. 'Production of steel fro1a low-gra.de (:25-30%) iron ore 
10. V!lnadiUlll from slag recovery procesa 
11. llew flc.i.x for weldin~\ magneoium 
12. Anodh.ed mngneaiwa .,hi.ch h!l.S fur face barc!n1rns equr. 1 tn th:i t of 
~lnodizf~d ~iluminura. 
lJ. Refinen~ontn Ju contin·uou;~ cnDti!1;?; of 11,:'ht ru~taln. 
14. Chemic~,1 ttdditiont< to iaolten mr.gnosium p!>rmitt.ir.g r-<id1wtkn c1 















h J; ')~,:1 





















:j'·( ·'.l\, '·/~<f..;::.,HJ;;,i>.!'..>O.;.f. .,,t,;.:•-:. ,.,._i$>.'-"'''·1,m <.A<·J -••!J • t•··'~ >'f'"" !· 
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!!. Fire Control ;"<nd Ballistics 
l. Our invea t:lgt< ti on of the G,.rman fire control f l.••ld r<1ves.l"d th" t t.h .. tr 
development in "ircraft, and aeaoot<IJt fire control equipment ware in-
ferior to those in tho Onited States, They were not as fHr adve.nced 
as the U.S. radar <iquipment. In the opt,ic11l .field, they were mor" 
advanced than U.S. ll.S rega.rda details of manufncture mid production. 
The range finder a which they were producing at the start of the war 
were equivnlont to tho.Ile which we Planned to produm• at the end of 
the war. However, this was not as important as it might. seem, becauoe 
our npplic.n tions of. radar to r~ngefindere had dimiuished the value of 
11on-rttdar rBngefind.<n·s. The Ger:narw ware using helium in nmgefincl.ers 
as e&rly 11.11 1939. 
2. In the field of seeing at nir~ht throul(h the uce of infra-red, the 
Germani; were fs.rther adv1mced t'rmn either the U.S. or tho Br1 tif:h. 
Their @quipmont on tha !'anther tank co11ld detact & moving ma.n ,,t, 700 yds, 
'!'heir portable ini'nntry nppari;tus cr,uld detoct n iuovi.rn~ :nnn at 60 yds, 
but it lwd the ob;j,,otion of be.in;,; too he1.tvy. 
t' EARf..tY HISTORY 
Brig~diar Gananl H.B. i3eylc>r, Chief Ordrnince ()f'fic«r, ETC, in " htter 
d"t~d 29 Jrmue.ry 1944 to Major Gener"l L.H. Campbell, .rr, Chit!f of Orfirwnce, 
fJ t1c< tod the t. 'plirnv "'"re then b»in;: mufo by the Combined Chicifr; c:>f ::.t,,ff to 
send tachniur•l axoertti into Gor!:l.;~t•Y iz~mediot·Dly nftor lht::: r'.urr\'lndi.ir :_,nti. 
surgoa.ti:td thf.'. t, if Ordr;.~:.rce 'ifere intarc1Btod' 1 t, 5hould conBlder F.1.nd so r.1.dvise. 
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,,,-1 ~ ; i; 
1de" ., 1th en t.huai1u1111 and t.ha t he ""II working with ind1.u1 try t.o u"l"o t " group 
of highly i;kil.l.ed men to fl.Ug11i.mt cert.'<in of our own officer!'.! "nd oi viliam• 
Go ell to 11end 11 well-rounded t!lsm to cover the various f:!.eldn. 
After an interim exch"n;;;e of correspondence between Ganera.l :::eyler .'!.nd 
Gonernl Compbell, in which the lutter wall kept a.dviaed of develo;>m~nts being 
m11de by the Combined Intelligence Priority Committee on Priority l Rlaclt 
Liflt Targote and i'fork1ng l'nrties, Genor11l Sttylor requonted nn 9 l\Uf<Unt 191.4 
thh t "If. tho Ordnnnoe.1 Depnrtment Msponsibilitten nro to be mot, it io im-
par11.tive that picked rapre11enU.t1ve11 b1• ready to om'*• to th1o th•mter on ver;r 
short notice nil the mttjority of Ordnance Dap!U't:nant r•ipresentntiven will hnve 
to be sciant11ltl11 fro:a the United Stnt1rn. The :'roper op'?!rnt.:1.ons of the pltttl 
would be highly feoilitntfJ(\ by sending 11 aicelr;ton force of seientistn t.;; this 
the0t0r l!.t. once. It it! t.entn.tively oatirc.o t•1<1 that fiftoen i••• th" tot•d nu:nb,;r 
of Or<lm.r:oe inveztigntora~. 
Genen1l C1'mpboll !tpprdMd tho mission on 9 AIWUPt 191,4 rmd u r>rnly nus 
nont to the Cmnmnnding G,m.,r1>.l• F.:TO, on ll Soptombar 1944 r;tr.ting th11t. Ordmrnca 
desired r11p1'aaehtiition on the Combined Int•)lligenom Prioriti•w Com.nittee ~r:d 
roqueatitd :!.:lllllediato upprovnl for •1ir trllvel for 15 picked ;>sr::,ormel. 
The follm1in;' officern, civilif1.ns nnd l'!f..Ca arriver! in London t.ho firot 
11eo!~ of Octoha1~ 1944, al: tho Ordmmce Dopartment nkoleton force fr>r 1·rork in 
c;m•:cction wtth th<.• c.ctiv:l.ti&!J ut' CIO:', !'ormerly tho C.I.P.C.1 
Cblon!3l H.H. :Z:ornig (o-29r,9), Chief of Group :1nd t1) cover C1'.Imon, .crmor 
and forrous tnJ'itallurp,-y. 
I! 
1 {!(1.1on\-ll H.~;. Morton (l1-/l25611), proxi1~11. ty ~--uzos 
; . J. ,."; •. ,.,. \'0 l'''"'l>'") ,.,,,,ri" f'''·•·a 
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MaJor C,H, Corey (0-9~04SJ), non-ferrous met~la 
Mhjor ll.V. Mack"y (0-~5046), B.rtillery 
MnJor J.~. Crewa (0-347699), lllllall arms 
M11Jor L.B. Magruder (0-378281) uutornotive equipment 
Capt Lee Nutting (0-280219) bombs, srnmuni tion and uir mines 
Capt C,C. Chaffee (0-1533413), i'uel:i and lubric>;ntii 
lst Lt Louise Marks (WAC-L-304875), interpreter 
T/J Jetin N. Schaeffer (WAC-A-217838) interpreter 
T/ 4 Henrietta J. Lohn"r (\'IAC-A-313298) interpreter 
Profeasor E,J. McSh10ne, l:lallit: tior,i and bB.llie. tic mol'lsureo<!!n ts 
Mr. W,R. Tomlinuon, Jr, explosives and pln~tics 
Mr. l!:,1'1. Ch1;ffee, fira control equipment 
Colonel F',F. Reed, Aauistr.nt M1lit-t>.ry Atttilche, U.S. Embn1rny in London, had 
nrrnnged office llpaoa for th.; group 0 t 38 Groavenor Square. '"ithin R """"k or 
t":o thero11fter the group moved to more oomr~odioua roomo "t 27 Grosvanor 
f3qunre • which W(tll the locH tion in London thro11gb the rem1.1. ining dure tion of the 
mi<a;ion. 
The group was ori1,~infally kno•:n iJll the CIOS Li&ison nr11.uch, but. th' t d"sigm1-
tir>n was ohnn11,ed t"'o •re<>k& lntar to Reiienrch :md Development flrrmcb. It "ms 
nsLivnsd to the Technicnl Division of tho Office, Chi•lf Ordnnnce 01."ficer, ?nrir, 
J'r:·,nce of .,,hi ch i.;olonel Gorton was then Chief. Since tli'l w.1ric of the llrc.nc:i re-
quired close cooper,, tlon "'i th the CIOS 1<nd with the !lri Ush '·HnL ti·ieB, l t •rnll 
deciuad Lo loc&te the offi.ce of tho Brrmch ir. Loncion. Conti.ct, ,.ith the Chi"f of 
th,~ Teohr1icnl Divi~;ion in ~)nri~: 7!tJ G :.1.1i in tnin·~d ~'>Y orof!t:t-chi~ nn 1·1l t0ler1hr.'Jrt~i and 
fre<!LtfSnt tr'J.µ::: to tl;or.~~· ·.y Li;!'~· Cli:1..o···· o:..~ tbl-J '1r< :1ch. r,ctu:-'..ll:r, (jirect.i,·:-n ('){' the 
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ad.ivitho of tho !!lraneh .,..r., left entiroly to tl:1 .. CM . .,fJ 
b· .. rnin1oms required to clear through the l'~.r1s office bt>ifl({ cnblogrn:u;. 
As mant1.oned above, most of the originnl group of offioorfl and civillano, 
upon arri vnl in London, wcro immedi•i.t,,ly @.Dpoin ted by CIOS as •u, S. Orgo.nizers" 
rmd members of •working P1,rtiea". These were po8i tinns of cmw:tder&bla rrnthcri ty 
end resp1maibili ty as the followin.ft gonenl description of each indic" tea. 
a. Organizer1u For each of th1> then 29 Bl~. ck List Gee ti.ons of CIOS 
intelligence, there were 2 orgrmi1111ra, one British and one U,3. It wo.n their 
r11qmnuibili ty to org.enhe a field tol!!Jil to invaatig11te en ch t11rget within the 
eeCti{>n, Th.,y evi;,lunted the expected intelligence nt e11ch tnrr,et and then 
iseleoted the lee.at number of the ber.t qualified opacil'll1.sts to properly inve~~ 
tignte the target. This org~nized, 1ipeoio.lly aelectod group of investi11et.ora WHl 
known A.e n. Field tesm. 
b, 1\'orking Portios1 There were e.pproxi.mR tely 10 Workin:;: ?o.rtiee, or sub 
sub-corumi ttee11, to which cros referred all tac~:nical quo~ltiorw cono..,,rning. the 30 
llli,ck Lh1t Sections. En1:h Worki.ng Party weri composed of e group of technic1>1l 
e:itperta, whone duty it. wao to "ppraise the •1any tnrgets oroposed by CIOS member-
~hip o.genc:l.e~, and decide whether or not they were of mufficl.ent importnnce. 
. . . 
to Wflrront inv<Jstigntion. !f so, the targets were included in the Dlrtck: Liilt. 
> 
ems ()rgt<nhF- tl.on 
ln ord~r to under~tt1nd mnro clonrly how t.ho Ordn:,rce Fef-~:'!r1 rch ~tnd Devf~lop'I-
ment !.ir~'dlCh run.ctior,f.n.1 in I~To, it is necce~·nr:; to '.<nnY:, )_n t!ene1•11l, t:bot~t the ·, 
' orgr.:nlzt~tion .wf and. op~Jr.!-".ti:)n of CIO:;.: • .i;.von thn·-.urh r:l·,---;; 'rh:ld nc cuthorit,'/ or. \ 
'f'i'/~~;Jnr'.Q~.'r:1il:l.\:.·- '.l'l~~r :~n:1 ,,f.' 'i.t;;o, '.~'.<.1mb·::r r-.p;~·:r:cy .i;~'v·,:,;-:t~.-- 1 
~' 
' ~ 
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through "hi ch all. th• activi tiee of the ,..,,.i><lr "'ii'"ll"l' inT,.i>t.iga torill "'"r" 
coordinated with cme anoth .. r and with the Armed Forces, or SHI.El" (SuprcaM 
H<wliqi.mrters Allied !!xpeditionary Forccaa). 
CIOS Wall ewu,b].iahed. 21 August 1944 by, and was r•rnponeible to, the Combined 
Chiefe of llt.d'f. It we,S oomptltH•d of. a tJ.il. milit1u·y chairrrwn, & Britinh civilinn ; 
Depllty Chnirr.atm, togett,er 'iii.th 16 members, $ British rmd 8 tl.S., ench member 
reprernen ting a eepnl'>l te Minis try or Agency. 
The objective of CI03 wtts to obtnin informn tion in the llmny fields of Germnn 
technical intelligence. ClOS had no teohnicnl investigators of their 011·n, but 
all teohni<m.l apeciaiiets who conducted invostii;etiona for tha member egonciea 
became known lltl eras inv<H•tigators. It WllS an instrlllllent whereby the a BritirJh 
nnd 8 U.S. l\genoiea could pool their target intellir,enoa, invetstignte tt?.r!;etil 
on n oombinecl bade and report their discoveriee to the CIOS Seorew,rfa.t, 
All technict'l infor,,,,tion or intelliw1nct1 of vititl interer,t to British 1md 
!J.,J .. inilit&ry, industry and scienc1> •ms cl11ar5ified into target cfi,tagories or 
1 tams. '1110 <lrigin.U. Ela.ck Liu t con ta:tned .30 auch Items but, i.n the Spring of 
l..945, when the Black Lif;t wns merged with the Grey Lillt there were H total of 
J.3. f'or i1u;tance, ItaL1 1 vins Rndrcr, Item 2 - Artill,,ry and l~eaponc, Item VJ -
ArnorHd ~'i1ihtin1r, Vehicles, Item 21 - Metallurgy, Item 24 - Meclicnl, lte,1 30 -
Fuclco And Lubrionnta and lttlrn 33 - Utilities. 
A. 131;-ck Lint ·:.01no prapttrad for £~&ch itot:1. It contv.inod rlt! m1.Jch infor:::-:~·-__ t.ion 
~l::J co:1l:~ be fJl'ncor-:~d (;n the exact locntlon of a t~1r~~0t, the phyeical condition 
of t.hH trlrt1:Ht, the ty~)e of inf.'i:1rm~·,t1.on {~xpeotud ~~t the tn.r,_:(~t,,. tovattu'".;l' ·,-.·itl.1 the 
I 










nv,1ner.i 1md hofll•j 11ddres1<es of key uex·m1rn personnel. rt Rll'O contnined iDfor:o-.o, Ucn i' I 
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fl Hr t.y. ln· g"n•rrd., lll.i.ok LiMt inf' or,.,,. ti on "'"" or1.i;l..rmLty a<mdd,.r<>d '"' th• t 
inte1llgence whS.oh wae of high op0r1<tion1<1. priority and which "G1lll.d """ist th" 
Alli"s in defe!l.t.ing Germ1my i<nd ,fop,.n. 
Early Problorna of the Resenrch 




:rargetu were inveu tigti. tac! by ter;mv, oompoued of Bri t.l.t•h • Cmn1vlian n.nd 
! ·'i 
! I 
fr ~ \ 
: .. ,~. 
'. 
inve11tigntar~, a.s quioltly 1<11> tholla turgetll fell into Allieid poase1wion. The 
highest priority targeta were considered eo im;iortant and valuBble that the l\ 
I 
military leader.ii were ordered to malte these trirgeti; their speci&l objeotivell a1~il 
/ ! 
to gunrd the!ll until CIQS t1111me ha.d CO!ilpleted their inVOiltigntiontJ, . I On the otfa1r 
/ ;1 
hand, the military leaders had 11 war tc: win. fi /. I Thuy couldn 1 t affor«: to leava · / 
/ 
eno1.•gh trot)pu b~.ck to gU&rr\ a target lon;~er than a f,.w duye, and since all 
avail!.lble transportation facilities were needed, th•ly couldn't per:ni t extra trip& 
taking investigators to rind from targets. r'e were told that if we did.n 1 t hAve o1l~ 
l.nveut:l.g~.tora in London or in Pi.ris, reitdy to go to the taq~et, on 21. houri; ndv1rnce 
no ti"a, they W<luldn 1 t get there. Yi 
We htLd to choose between tnking key industriitl and echntific p0nonnel from 
their import1rnt .jobs here 11ml take the clmnce or tl1eir not gettinu to tho targ.otl'l 
ur1til a.ft.er t.h~l t,arg~ti:\ ht1d been inv~ut1P.;&ted by othern. It ~·"tlS leB\S com1.)l1c~!.ted 
i'or the Hritish thHn for us, becaur.e ·their 11mecia.liztn wer<1 quickly av,,ilBble rit 
hrnn., or "t their job ii. 
ln r1itro1>pect it seems ai::iple, but 1.:i U·"'' f,,11 "nd 1111rly Winter of 191.1., 
'n,~ thc'. .• ght \"HJ hhd ao:-ai:i mii~hty flifficu.l.t ;)roblen.1& tr::.~1.11.~ t"\"': "ntit.!:ln'.· t.·,! nnr~"Mel'H 
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».... Wilt Ger:;:i.o::n:t 
from to·r:n to town? 
b, If •1e e.dv1ulce slowl,y, what p~rt11 of G'1<rl'll1~ny will fall first? 
· c, llolV mueh of Enetern Germnny will we hgve an ovportiinit.y to 
inveFtigate, which, of C<>urfle 1 depended upon Rus11ia? 
@• Should we rrepnre to investigate t1.u·gets in the llerlin U'""? 
l: 
If so, 11hould we send in commrmdos nnd t'ly in investig!l tors 
shortly thereaft .. r? 
We knew soraethini; of the ple.nr1 and strategy of tha Allied High Co>ntll•md, 
but no one lmew those of Hitler, who, of eourEui, &ould not be disregorrlacl. 
In ei.rly October 1944, it appeared tlmt a sudden Germnn coll!'pBe """11 11 good 
po1rnibility and thr,t the totnl number of teohnio"l inva111;ig,,tora O.Vft.ihbla 
from both Britru.in 1;ml O.S. wes sui'fioiant to inveetir,11.te onl~' " limited nWllber 
of the hif;he1Jt priority t11rgets. Aocordingly, the firl'lt Blnok LilJt, cont~.ined 
only those targets where technical intelligence 1)f direct or indirect l'iilitr.ry 
value was expected. By le.ta Oo to bar 1941., it became apµiu·Bnt thll t an imminent, 
sudden collapse of Germany wtw highly improbable, The fll'1.0lt Li flt 1><a6 then re-
viuad and exp8nded., •md plH1rn were laid f'or inve~tig£lting targets ae they f"ll 
into Allied hnnds from streBt to street and to"'n to tol'<!1, A.l,so Rt this time, 
11 Grey Lir;t wa!' prermred, From the ilUtllet, CIOB reoognhed thnt many technlce1l 
in tolligence t11rcetu had been excluded from the Rlnck List aven though they 
1.~if(ht C'>nt11in intelligence of vit.ul interest to Br5.tinh ''·nrl u,:; .• inc\u$try nnd 
ronn~).rch f:lDtf. bli~:hr::'E~ntr... It therefore ttt~ta.blirhvd the Grey Lii:t ":hich c:cn1.ninBd 
tlirr;eto, r.ot or' 1L1ffl.ci•,11t militf'ry 1.lrf.'.ency to justify ind1;i1·Ji0n in the lilt.ck 
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Wlum th" f"""'u11 "'!lo ttle of th" T:lul;s•" oar><•• 1 t. 0,pp;uu·•d 
,,,_ 
:_, ./ J., ;,. f ,:\ 
..,., might h«ve to invest1g&ttt m•my tnrq<1ts «11 'lvur o.gei.n. llowev<0r, it 1u111 
quite gtlnernlly believed that thin """' Germ11.ny•e l.iuit deep breath llnd that a 
rapid Allied break-through on 11. broad front waa egein a g0od probebility. '!he 
exper1•moe gained from invAst.igations of targot,1; in France, Belgium, Hollnnd 
and LuxGlllbourg showed that, althongh our Blac'K List inwlligenoe wnll subtttan-
tinily correct, l'IU'.U;f targ•1ta had moved from tlHlir originl'\l locntiontJ or "ere 
not eondaoting their expected 11ctj,v1 ty, This meant thn t oombilt troopil were• 
in many oases, gu~.rding to.rglllte of negat:l,ve1 intelligence value 1rnd th1tt highly 
trained upeainl.ia ts wer" sent long dis tnnces . to t:>.rglil ta which they were not 
qunlit'ied to inver•ti1~a te. 
Caft Ooera tions 
To rJ1eet the!le chenged conditfono, the existing CIOS rlnn of on'>r'1tions wai; 
drmiti<mlly revised, The lll1>.ck ant! the Gray Lists were merged into one 'f!>.r,>,et 
Lit1t and the plan for Con1iolidated Advance Field Teruns (CAFT) was f'ormulo ted, 
GAF'l' 1)rovided that ~ limited nu.11ber of qualified specialiata would move t'orwa.rd 
with the a<lvancing &rmy fJll'1!l.rheads, As a target ''"'rn eeized, thee.a specialir,ts, 
called Ci\FT 1>as<rnoors, quickly appra1aed it, and Bdvhed t.i.e cor:.ba t comrrm.ndora 
whether or not it '"P- t' of' ruff'icicn t 5.r:ipor ta nee to merit gul!rding hy troo'"' • 
Rr;c:iortr; ooverin:.; each t1'rf1;t nS5l'iiS:>Hmt werH ser:t to th0 !?eRr to C1WT l~"C:erfl 
n t t..'i'.i-Cb t~rny Grz·:up, r<.nd by th om throur:h mili tar.y chr,.nr.RlE to th'a CIC~~ EHcret£irl1;1 t 
in T ... ondon. 'J'argeta which >:1eri tcid ~-t~rther detailed invortlg{J t..ion '-Ve.co thf;lJl ex-
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The early invetJtig!<tiona of targetu in the Germen occupied cm,mt,rieu, Z<lOh 
a!l F·rn.nce • B~lgium, Holland 1md Luzerobourg revealed th., t the Germ,,ne h1":\ not. en-
tr1wted \\heir mo£<t valur;bl" developmenta iand proc<>$!leB to thia~e people, "™\ thnt 
'·•• 'ITould not stnrt to rec0ive re11lly v1ilue,bJ.e tecrmical int.<>lliw><•<"' until 
tt>r;;ets on Gernw.n soil 'l<ere cp1; turad. Thol'l<il e1.1rly targets did, however, '.1rovide 
~iu:y valuttbla lee.do in Gern1uny 51roper, 
A total of 3377 targets wer•~ eflseased by CAFT, 
A total of' approx1mst.1;ly SOO field team reports were prem,r0d by ClOS 
teclmici>l 1nveHtign tors, 
BIOS nnd FIAT 
ClOS dh~olV<lld on lJ July l9l,5• but technical inv11t;tii;n tionf:I h«.d not yet 
been entiraly oompl1'ted, 111 order tn oomplete tha .lob oimil1•'r orp,~.niz!ltions 
"'"''~ formed inde;:i-..ndently l:ly both the 13ritish nnd the U.S. Tho BrHinh cl1.rng0d 
th& word "Combined" to•Brithh" imd called theirslllOS. The 'l,S, orp,~nit.nt:l.ton 
wn i; called 1"I AT, which rr.ea.llll "field Inf or ma tfon J\,\l<lncy, Teclmic'11", ~:ven 
tL.:':igh th" combined Brl tif.h - U ,S. orgnaiza tion, diirnol vetl, th,;ore W'1S " a tron1: 
d<H»lre on th" pnrt. of both oou11tl'ie11 to contlnuc the clOl'" coo11ercH011 whid: h&<l 
<lXiGteid. '!310:0 invefltigatione were 111.11de in •the ll,S. ~one !11\f] FlAT in thfl Briti.sh 
·.-Jor1~:t. 'rherefQt"~, in add-1. tion to CIOS r<·lports, there t'lre FIAT reports which 
~'.·i~::,,~:~·::_,{\}· .. ; <.'. . 
cmwr t<rnnnicn.l invo1>.ti(;a ticna of Gerr.ia'!lllj:!i.lfil,~ii~quent to mid-July 19/,5. 
Q.rdnr 1~ca Ci vilihn Inv(~rtig.-, t~.r~: 
Alt.ft1Jl,.1~~h CIOS 1.nvnst,ir.~n ti~Jne were rnaclo under contrnl o.f tf"H~ ~·'.ili tnry 
l'.1Lth0ri ti.r~~; 'Ul.d in comb11t :aons~:;, hunr1redfl or Pri ti:;h r:nd ;'t:~eric~~n cct;,~nti:~-tfi lf'hC 
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1nVhOtigator11 a debt of gratitud•. 
condi tiona. In 11omo <11>1<es, th<> 'targets unrl,.r inv<111 tig" tion ••re 'bet>r••m the 
ent1my and our small artillery. In oth"r oav,e13, the 'tll!rgeta 11u11r<J used 1u1 foM111rd 
observation posts end as billets for front line t.roope. Throughout a.ll the 
inv11>1itigations in Germany there w~,ii dsm;m· of sni'1inv,, mines, end booby trftps. 
Fortunately, or the several hundred investiga.tori; :lnvolvod, only two loet their 
lives, one a U,S, Captain am! the other his jeep driver, a U.S. Sergeant. 
In rm effort to obtain the best qualified personnel for CIOS investigd.1.ons, 
the Ord.no.nee Department tried to obtain the servic11s of civiliru.n employees of 
private r~onoernll which had been engaged in the ;>roduetion or dev(1lopillent of' 
Ordnance Materiel. Nationally recognized aseociBtions and org•rniza tionll rrnsillt<i!d 
the Ordmmea Department in selecting these technicians by providing recmnm<.mdn-
t:lon!l of individuals 'l'lho were coniJidered b<wt qualified for the job and who were, 
at, the sa,11e time, available for an overr.i•iais e.sr;ignment. ~utouiottve experts 
were obt.'\inod thr,>U•~h th(> SAE Wi.r Enr.ineering Bonrd, metallurgists thr'm~:h the 
American Iron and Steel lni>titute, explot1ivea experts through the ABsocie tion 
of f'xploaiv•~s Manufocturero and Opti(:itl Glaat1 Specie.lillts through the lfat,ion•l 
3uregu o.f ~·)ta.ndards. 
,j 
Griev,.ncea a.I' Civilian Technical Inv.,,stirrn. tor a 
One•· compld.nt, common to ;irncticnlly every Ordn,rnce civl.litm irvont1r;P.tor 1 
Y-inH tht~ fact thP_t they ~~ere exposed to r15 :.::iuch dt~nii9r from ntr~~f.~,_ bochy tr<'.;)S 
nnd tlniping at; ;,ere nf'ficer1.i, but still thBy ''"re not >ercc.1itted ''"ual ;)rot·ectic·n1 
1 .. e. of c.:;rryinf~ f'irearcin. ;,ainor grievances 
1 
woru whnt they (~ont:-id~~~r.:>:d n::;b.n.rrast!int;:'J 
r,uch thin,s aa1 
r'/" 
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a. Not b.,.l.ng permitted to get roo.,11 or bil.lliltlll <:>n an •~Will 
bnsia with offio .. ra. Many of the :l.nveet.igator"1 ,.,.re 11til'IULl!.t&d. 
Colonels, but in Lond<Jn, ?1arie and in Germnn;r, the Army plao'ltd 
them lower thm.n 2nd. Lieutone.ntm aa regMrd11 billetm. !n oth"r 
worda, the Army took care or the Army First, aivili~.ns sect>nd, 
b. Irrt1gula.ri the or non-uniformity of ragulrct tions in Wiiehington, 
London, Paril! and Germrmy as regRrds uniforms for oivilinns, 
espeainlly shoulder patches "nd insii~nia on their hata. Ul.iny 
investigatora were told by M.P.s to remove the braid frOl!l the 
edge of their overMaa hats, in fact, aevernl •ere forced to do 
so before they could get. into the Army meas in London. In Pnria, 
they were told to put the braid btrnl' on their ha ts. Some in-
ventigntors were told they Bhould rer.wve the U.S. gold lett~rs 
from their oversee.fl ha ta, others were tt,ld tho reverse. '~. l' .11 
ut.opped m.~,ny 11. civilif,n inve~tigntor for not. h11viTw any or the 
proper ahouldot• Ph tch indio" tin,~ thrt t h<ll wrw a toohnic".l ir.v,,t1-
tigntor for the Army, 
o. CIOS investiga.tor teams were compoaed of hoth llri tit1h nnd •.r.s. 
inventigator5. 'rh<1 runking oi'fioer of tho group .,,.a,.1 1rnr:urr.lly 
made th<' t<Ht!ll Cl'\.pttdn or Ler;dar. Au m1ch, he h"d c<msi~ar< ble 
uuthority r.nd responsibility over the tenr;i, Si.r.co t.b:r Sr:.t:'h 
gave thi;ir ci villr,n invetJ tir,:•1 tor ii tHmporary cc~ud;; donv 5 n the 
vnr:7..ou.c Servicag, thoir men ':.7BI'f.'} gener" lly \G!:.de ten.:.:i lt:nderb., 
'rheir tem,?ornry commissionn >:ere gener··Uy Lt Color.01 or full 
Cvlor,(1lr;, whie!·. l.iOAnt thnt th~:r rAnkad 99'.t of tbo Ordnnncs 
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civilir.111 inve:etlf!,t:itorr. ct" tt8-f-i.~_mt.l)')t"'d r~nk. 'ih1¥> •e..tt t; bit~r 
pill to take eom" th«•O, eupeoially by U ,s. ill"Uly officer11, who 
genere<lly reo.,nted rJC•lng tole' to do thinf{ti by & non-military 
Bri tishel:) eapecittlly in Q.Jh 12th e,ml 2b t Army Group Arens, 
ulJling !h!?.· billets, mei;s and tr~.nuport1•tl.on facilities. 
d. A few Ordnance inveetige.torl!I nrrived in London with the miHtaken 
impreeaion thnt their a.ai:inlilnted l'W.nk entitled them to ill 
privilegea µeoulinr to that full army r1mk. Al! indic11.ted Hbove, 
tho:)' ·\;V!re en ti tleo to equal privilege llG reg1.1rds billetll, mesa, 
trnnsoortntion,· med1l1nl and dentnl atter'.t1on, officer:;• clube, 
Pont &xchnnf<t'I (PX) <ind quartermni;ter (QM) etoret\. The•)' were, 
however, not entitled to give ,,r r<>oeive artlutea, to muil lett.ors 
free o.f chnrge, to sei;d ;;if ts home free of duty or to receive the 
liquor re.tione on the Continent. 
Organ1;_nt1ol:l of Roaenrch nnd Develo;lm<mt llrnnch 
The allGignment of the ori£;1nBl personnel in the 1">11'!>,,rch ~nd Develc:im<mt 
Branch io ~hown in the o.ttr,.ched copy of Office Order #J. 
Colonel H.H, l.ornig reeign<3d as Chief of tno Br~nch, 14 Dec ... : .. ber l''.)l.f., to 
b"come Chief, Technical Int•1lligence Tlranch, A.C. of S,, u-2., J\:'r:yJSA. It co-
ordirn. ted and supervised the t1>cl1nicn.l intellit~<rnce 1>ctivi ttoP ~r the 11even 
Technic~:l ;;:ervices of ETOUSA; i.e., Ordnance, !:;ngineers, Qunrter:-;:&.ut.0:r Cor;)n, 
'TrnnHDort.B<.tion Cor;.l&, Sir~nal C:·.-rqo, :-1iedici\l Gor)l3 f!nd Chemical i:-:~.rfc::ra, ::~r.d 
raprevented th"ir intaresta on th" Cln:; e.nd Gro,y Li:;t Pmial. 
Lt Col Cor~Jy, then ',1~jor, cn.rrl'l::H1 qn PD ActinP: Chiof of tbH Rr:-nch fr~m 
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shown :tn. the m.ttftcb.e-d copy of O.ff:tcia Order No. J (Cht~ng$ _lil.'J. ;z).. C.01onnJ./q\1inn 
b<>c!Ulle Chief" of the Brnnoh 13 April 191,5, with oft'ioee in Pe.ris, Fr11nce. . Lt 
Col Corey becnme Deputy Chi"f of the Brrrnch, in chorge of the London Office, 
Th:U> set-up.remained until 10 September 191.5 when the London Officems cloMd, 
All inveatigatiomi h~d been C<,mpl»ted, b\lt e. backlog of taric"t 1rnd ;.irorcr''~s 
report;1 renmir.ed to be edited and typed, The Reports Unit then moved to the 
Pnris Off.ice 10 September 1945 where their work was o<'mplatod by late Oat;ob<>r 19/, 5. 
All peraonnel, exaeot the tr1mt1lators, of tho Research nnd Dovelo-pment Brnnoh 
were on T.D. from t.'1e Office, Chief of Ordrnrnoe. The T,D. was r;enerr.lly for 
90 ·!nys, which was renewed in those oases where longer duty vrn rJ required. Bec~use 
of t'.•is relatively short period of duty in the ETO 1md beoa.use all inwatigntorl'J, 
11ftur '.fa.rah 1945, were continually traveling between Lond.()n 1 Paris and G®rmnny, 
it. i:i not possible to show a.n organization chart which appliee to more then two 
day~. The att!'l.ched Organization Chi;.rt, dated :28 Jlllle 1945 1 ahowi;; the organha-
tic,n wt en it w1w at its peak. 
The a tt(1ched Organize ti on Chart, dated 15 Aur,uet 194.5 1 sho>'s th0 aseignm;.,nt 
of ,):Ol:"ti':mnel of the Research end Intelligence Br1'nch. It crnnbir.ed the ;.iersonnel 
of t:ca Iwsenrch (lnd Development llnnch with tho''" of the Technici:l Intolligenc·i 
Srnnch (formerly under Col Toftoy) under Col Quinn, as Chief, ·;;i th Lt Col John A. 
K.eck and Lt Col C.H. Coro~7 ns D13tput:-l Chiet~s. 
\!'he l\frne1>rch 11nd In tellli;enc>'I Brro.ncb l'!iS organized. n;J1Jroxim1' t.oly 4 J1.ilr t. 5. 
Colonel (,:uinn <fapr.:rted the ''TO t!w letter ''"rt of l\\lg\wt 19/.5 hnvinrt become 
Chif:lf of th)~ '!ochnil:~il Divii.3ion, P~TO, <:\ few dnyr Jr8v:i.ouoly. Lt Col Fr".nklin 
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of th" Tecl:mio .. l Divi11ion. Th .. "h<>l$ 2>tO Ordt!tJtH'l<> r;r1p,nlhti;:.n d1.11iut,.gI·n ted 
rapidl.y thur,.at't.er, th<il t.ochnii;ml. inv<iatiµ;,. ti on W<ll'k h"d b@•m oo,,.pl..,ted 1rnd 
ev,1ryone "anted to get home. Both Genrnny and Jnµrm h1td blilen defeat.ad. 
Other Teehnical Intellig'lmee GidJ_lering Afl:<>nciea 
In April 1945, there we:re >1 toti;l of 19 differc-mt Britirh-U.S. agencies 
!I!l.thlll:dng intelligence on Germany. All 19 hsd pi:«wided the vr.rioua Armieo 
with the n~mos and loc11 tionii of targets in Germ1my which th lily we.nt"d tn inves-
tt1-; .. te. Most of theae 19 "~rencies '>fere ceeldng opere.tlonttl nnd co11ntar-i11telli-
gence infclrm.11 tion. Of the~e 19, four were promillently known in the acientifio 
and induntrial intellig•rnce g" thoring field; i. a., CIOS, ALSOf3, l!SSBS, ~ml nnm1. 
t\, ALSOS was an en ti rely l\.mericun or1p.niZ11. tion, Sp1Jnsor~•d by G-2 1 
W.i>r Depart:oant to s;<athr<r tochni<rnl intelliv,enae, much the ~11me 
!l.S that g11.tllered b:; C105. It ""S a r0li;. ti vely emnll orgimho ti.on. 
The lettera ALSOS, Fill fn.r '"' I can det,ernine, "re not the abbrewinti0n 
for nny English wards, th~~Y gre Greek, ECtl.1elly nnd Qt.ber1uifiG. 
b. USSBS ata.nds for Jnited !3tat•Ja ::trategio Bombinp; ~)urvey. lt wa~ 
eetnbl.inhed by the l're.,ident, freoretary of \''nr end Chief of' Str.f.f, 
u.;), tirmy to study the effects of.' atr1'tegic bombin1( c>pon the 
ae-pacity •md v>ill of Ger;o,,ny to me.k:e ,..,,r, •W well ''i' tho dirsct 
nnd. :lndirec t cor.sequoncat~ 'df at tgckn on epacif ic ~c.nt~Ufi tries. 
c. BBHM f;tnnds fer Bri tieh Bombint.~ Ret>Uhrch ;-~issior:.. l t ···f',El un Bn-
tlrr;ly f.\ri.tii:.h orge.niz&ticn •stid1.Listed for asf;entif.1lly the S!!.r!.10 
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'fh<J Brit.J.ah Miniatriett imd D<>pt!.rtmlllnts had <.rnmpil.<>d a v11Pt am"unt of 
:lnfcrmathm mid int0llig11nca on Germlln r~moarch, dev.,lopm•mt &nd induntrial 
personnel.,. aotivi ty and locmtionll, They h"d worked for years on 1 t ttnd 
hAd it readily available in uanblo form. 
1'1hen we of the nucleus organization of the Resef,rch 1md De-~elopm0r1t Dr1inch 
first arrived in London, ·He had to start from eora tch obtt< . .ining nr; nuch infol'-
m11tion as possible on th•J targets which were then in tho Black List. '/lie h1ld 
taken absolutely no au ch l.nforw, tion w1 th Ull from the Stn tes and, if it hnd 
been available hara, we never knew it. \\'e knew tht.• t the 11rit1eh h!!!d it, but 
the Job was to ferr.,t Ol4t the pro;ier Ministry n11 well at> the ;irom•r individi.mls. 
rhenev6r any one of our. group learned 11 new sour.c-s, it was speedily bror;dcnut 
to otharrl in the llrnnch, »nd before mnny weeks, e.ll of us b!lC:;me quite f,,,;;ilbr 
v•i Lh the British llovermtwnt set-up. Cont11.otr. with the Brit.iflh na tern11 
¢1?g.:'"!,_fli:4fltrs, as tetun memb~}rts and nu 'Nor1llr,;;.; ?n,rt:r mf'.~f.'lber~ nlno ·"'~ffo:rded valunble: 
e·:)n t.,".{.c t::{ and lertd s" 
The followiuf Britii;h Minietrfoi1 andD&n11rt"'"nti; prov1.ded the Bnnch much 
v.~lu.·tb:b !ntelliv,enc« on Ger~urn t.argete1 
Economic Advisor::· !lu.nc!i ( i•;,rn) 
Ministry of Zo0nomio '.'lnrf,,re (i.iE"1) 
Lnnsdtlwne Holli><!, London 
M.I.-10 and M.I.-19 
'Ihe '-"ar Off1c,,, "''hi tehell, Lon,ion 
Air Do'°e.rt:,,.;nt lntelli(i;r,no••, ~'-llb-<'ect:tn:c K ( 1 .• r.I .K.) 
rtohley Gtl.rdAnU, Lor.lion 
1' : • t·· . t f "'" ,. i'' < i ''" ()) ,,. f ) i.1~ .•• p,.1.r ....~ n,, o .~ ... ;1.~ ... J.._, 1.',··· • ,, •.1. 
Admiralty, Chobht«il, .i'11f'. Lnd 
e .\ ·r·:l.j ''i • ''··1· · •h ~·:,,.-. 1·~·1"""t ("· ...... [' ) •~·C-<.t:,.1.. •. ~. C ,tJ ·.>1f·rC" ; ""'' •.. 1:... ....~ .. • '• 
F:n·.r;.' t~r1·:1h·~, Ld1cn;~t1;l' :·,·· .. i.:•r•::, Loc~-on 
<I 
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t.ilr.i~tr:i· of Airo:t•nf't Pr\'1ductic1n (M.A.?.) 
thar""B Hou11e, Millbnnk, London 
'.· .- ";,·; \.'') 
'Ile lenrn•Jd ,, t i'irfl t the. t the llri ti11h wo«ld gi ""' ue s.nythj.ng we asked 
for, bi.lt thiriy wet·e alow in volunt;~r.:ring informntion. I~n:t(-:ir, h~v10vor, gftar 
we b!lc!l.tfie more fully acqmd.nted, they bemune most coop<;rntiv'" in famt more 
cooper11 tive than one U .s. fAgency to imoth"r• 
It ii; the "t~i tlllr 1 e ')pinion th11 t the cuabineid Bri th1h-;; .s. inveetig11 tion 
of.' Ger11mny re~ul ted in benei'its to each country which could not h1:..ve b"en 
obtained aopar•.i tely. Thay were espeoie.lly helpful throughout the fir1.1t few 
mcmthtl of our cor.1bined relt<t1.ons in providing pr<;liminury intollii(once on 
Germ1rny, They provided "' gren ter number of inve!J t.!.gn tors th·'"' we die, which 
w1u1 m.turr>l. bac"uf.e of thoir oloseneiiis to the tan;etr. Their f'1cilltiea 
for 1mrned1.ate axnmi.m"tion of mt<terial we..s hl'llpful to us ar. well ns tc: th<rn. 
They gave us nse:l.str.ne"• ~.t variou~ Umee, by providing trr.rnr.l!itions, 
photolltn.t11, µhotogrnplrn end typing help, They hr.ve a huge ciocuLll'Jnt <1st~blit1h-
ment at Fort Hnl1Jte,;d, s.nd e r,mRller on<l ~t t.'Hi J:e::iartt~'>nt of TAnk tienign, 
th;; benefit5 o.f v;hich 1tro bein1: r.wde nvnil!!.ble tn ll:'l thr<JUV.h raoeipt. of 
regul11r noeesaion lii;ts shewing t1·,,1 German dnc'..llll<mta loca t,,c\ tt,itx·e. TfH)re 
docu:uon ts e.ro e.va.ile.blo.• to un upon re . uegt, i believe tr1 .n~lt' tod, /Inc; tha :· 
point is th.'. t. tlrn Bri thh industriiilictu continued to invee.tl.p" t" GC1r'c.1·n:r 
lor111; :·,fter "ti·e f::to'~"i:)o(!,. --~nd tt~3ir rtJ:.::-ort£ er1:1 be:\r:lr ~it.de nvr-!il<·.bl1;; t.:.' uf; 
th:i.:)'.l~{;1 BIOS (Driti[:;h lnte1livunce Ol)jr::ctiv~c r\t_~oncy) vit,, Colon 13l '.-:end, 
our 1\asl.1,1trnt 'Hlit1.ry Attllche iu London. 
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lnveatiga_tors •ho1 had tJ1oy been ot~hq:rr1·l.!·\{'' :;~ight nut hi,v1t1 boon ec: ivtl'1CQ{fl$ 
in London or the recipient of eo gent>rmw cooperri Um;. The Ord1w. nee Deµ•.rt-
ment provided a large p<i11'centng0 of the trnna ;•or tr< ti on 11.nd trucking f&cili tial'J 
for CIOS activities. 
It il3 true ttrnt there were 1.1 fe'll i:oolf..ted heated disci\S~ionfl betw"''" the 
British and U.S. invErntigators over minor issuer., but thnt J.t; e:qiectw1, even 
in families. The overall resultfl, however, weri> exceedin~ly gratifying to 
both Gidea when, for the firllt time e.ince rie 11sta c)liehed our Independence in 
1776, it was demonetr1J.ted thu t a lnrge groua of teohnlciann frQm both 
cou.utrhia cnuld work and live tog'-lther 110 h;,rmonioualy. 
Miscellaneous Observn tiona 
lt was ler.rned th»t the best ·r-ay to obtain •>ll the detail informotion of 
the :>roject~ on which Gernmn 0ngin0erB and scientiota wer,., l'!'orldnf' V<nF tn ht:ve 
them prepare a written report on BP.ch ;iro.J<!!ct. This, th13y were gen•,rclly 
•dlling to do. If the; :i1<id they needed two ,:ny:< we '1f0uld order them to 
!rnve lt ready to ;iic~< uµ in one dl\y, Mo!;t !!oiantiots nr(l proud of their 
n.ocomplishklen t~ !lnd al'\'I a11Xiou~ to adverti:;;e their ouccer.ses, lWen to their 
conquerors, if their nllme aiJpears as the e.uthor of their re:1ort. 
In Berlin, we were told by t1everr,l to;i-notch <cientist,r, "nd inr\ur-
trie.llsts thHt ·the Hussinn:J pttid tl1e Ger:nnn sciQntists so ml1ch ~·er n~.1 g:;) for 
thelr ·reoortt:.i.. Thooe ::,;1,_:· .. o peo;-.le in Berlin told us th!. t th1:1 Fussianr~ hr:.:.d 
rondo itey Cer~1H: n ~cit~n tis ts ~)~lch :~ t tr.~c':..i VO of for~.: to ;::o ~:.;) r~~af.:ia to c::1n-
tinue thi:~ir r-esenrch t1rojecte th:~ t tlit~Y cculr:!~--:' t, (l f'for .. _~ to r,;-,f'upo. Th~ 
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the b-0,;t. 1,1ci,.nt.i11t in G@rw.ny on :!NCleiM pllysicll 1uld Urn cyclotron. fHs 
equij)lllent and ell. reports of hill work aco0111p11nied hi•• Prof. ~itel, whom 
WEI :Lnt•.n:·:rogated, nn int,,rnntionnlly known cer~.miaa epec1alict, wal'J lenvinrr, 
for Ruimia 11hortly therea.fter. He .,,.a taking his aomplet<1, huge libi·ary 
11.s w0ll as his fronily. fie mid thf.Ct he would have preferred to '"'rk for 
th@ Briti11h or the U.S., but hia work wna his life and it made little 
difference where he did it. 
I h•AVf!l given considerable thoti.ght to the question of how our techni-
cal investigationll of Germany could have been improved. ~ll in nll 1 I 
feel that the job vms vwry well done under the conditions, and ths.t few 
iJJprovementll could be me.de. Any aye tern, of necessity, hes to be eufficiently 
flexible to cover numerous possible atra tegiee of the Armed Forces a.nd 
sur?riseB of the enemy, 
There "'ere ina.ny compleints of duplication of effort, much aa one p?.r-
tioulm: t.rirget having been investigated by "a many 1u1 30 different inveati-
gator tetJ.:us. Calm nmi..lysis dicta.tee that thim may not hr,ve been so un-
rmwons.ble. l doubt trw t 0. fewer num.her of tea.ms could do a sa tiBfactor;r 
job of inveHtii:;ating a large corporation, lluch as U,S. Steel, General ".lotor~, 
or e. lnrg<~ laboratory, such all Bell Telephone Labor1.1tori"s, 
There hllVB been complailltt: th1,t the British nnd the :J.~o. ir.vesti,,;,.tors 
t:ihouJ.d not }1ava been combined lnto 1.nveat,ip.:ntor teams. ~,'ly ·.)er::;ongl f.~el:Lng 
is th''t the ',;,:J. <{ained at lou:;t Hh rrruch ua they .f:t\VR by thl<: c:ion.·:1'.<>tion 
nnd thnt our clm1e 11tH>cci . .'· ti•m in Clm:: nc ti vi ties h&s <rnt" bl.ii.•hNl the factd-;,;{·· 
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prob:l.em. :U, Vl'-IG a problel&I tilrnug!rnut tJJ.., 'lti:mla 1nve:;tJ,.g,,tion ,,f QQrraany • 
Ev..cyone knew it "•a not lmnllled properly but no one appea.r.id to know the 
answer, For e:x1tmple, auppo11e the firf<t t,<>sm et " te.rget wr;.a interastacl ln 
chemicals. S.ince mont invoetigatorF. couldn't r..,ad German, that t.~mm, to 
b" oerta.in of getting all the inforomtion possibl.•)• woul.d evecuRte prcc-
tic«lly all the document~l at tlw.t targ•st to some location in London. In 
the group would be valuable docUlllents 1.m ple.f>tics, rubber, metallurgy "nd 
i'uelo, The result was thut the informi· tbn on subjricts, other th1rn chemicals, 
Wot1ld probably not re11ch the 1Jroper technicirms for analysis and appre.lsel 
until. long after the wnr was over and all qualified snecinlist.s were 
B.ca ttered back into civilian nctivi tiee, Also, when thR t particulnr t"rget 
w.,,., 
JM visits<! later by plaat.ias, rubber or iuetc•llurgice.l s0eci,.lists they coulcn 1 t 
do s :ie.tisfl.ctory job because the ecientists they interrog~. t<idrec·~ir" their 
documents 1md recordo for references, Divorce a. aci.entir.t from hi.e reports 
and records and you reduce his value at least 50%, 
This ;Jrnblem could be. solved by leaving lllll documentn Hr.d r~oords at, 
the f'HJtublillhfi\ent, under gunrt1., cmtil th"t p&rticular thrget hnd becm com-
pletely investigRted by ~11 concerned. lmitead of av1-,cus.ting tons cof vrdue-
1.Nlil docurnentt; out of H conquered country, leRve them 1't the tnrgetr' 'lnLil 
t,he,y ct:t11 be ~sorted and claseifiecl into EUbjectn. Then, qunlifind techniclnns 
should choo1.1e which few document.u are af ,;uff'icient, vnlue to jurtify ev>•ctrn-
tion 1rn<l trcr1£lation. In the 1nei.mtl..de, r.ll docuoent>·: er'' twr.ile.bl'' on the 
s11ot .ft;r thf.~ ')rBpnrtitinn of re,)orts by the ~.ieier~tintr ccn1c~r·t~':!f. end .for 
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ti;,,, t 1.eas t,lWXI 1.:1\ of 1!1,1.1. 9TI<<:!\U<t, .. d G .. l:\'lll!l,li\ doCU!ll..ntll Ill'.""' of 1Juff1.01.<>nt 
int~'re" t to , jua tify trane1.a t:l.nil. 
This h:tnt"ry would not b11 complete without ref.1n'<mce to the fact th(,,, t 
• 
the Ordnrmoe oainr>:l.0n W!W directed tii;iec:l..fically ,by the Ra~o~,reh e,nd Develop-
mant Service, Oft'iae, Chief o.f' Ordnttnce, under the lM11dershlp of Major Gener~.l 
G.hl. Barn<1s ond Colonel f>. !l, Ritohie. 
C. H, Corey 
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v Ii;! ). 1 •• ~·-, ~· 11.1•· \ii "A<i n1· ls 11111.ny ti ' ejf' sa"..l,..~1""this ill l ,... 
offic-.Ni and e~g~onsible for the deaign and production of U.S. 01·d11,mce 
a W1!1!' in w!tfoh th"' 
materiel must assume a large portion of the total effort necessary for victory. 
This mechanization has necessitat"d an enlargement of the traditional military 
"'''k of@ 
I Oo 
concept of "intelligence". Combat, tactical\trategic intelligence are still 
field of int>0lligence of equal value 1i.i the other great importanc~, but a new .,~ 
fielS,has been added - technical int~llig-cnce. 
In order to design and prodL:ee weapons superior to thdise of the enemy, these 
Dtficers 1md ••ngineers must know wlrnt the enemy has done in the productfon of his 
own weaponn, whnt he is now doing and what he plans to do. As Ordnance Intelligence 
officers, you nre a very important cog in the machinery which has been set up to 
su~ply inf'orma tion on enemy ordrncnc<' to those responsible for the denign of O'.S. 
ordn!1.nce. 
It :is now my }urpos;o to ''xpld.n to you the machinery of ord211mce technic1<l 
. - ,_ "'""'"'"-,,~,,,,~·-
~ .. ,.,__;::;:·;;:·"'~"'''''·'.:·.:.::::::.::::.:.::::: ;~ '-""'- . . . . . -'' "• ""' _, _ _.,,.,,~ .... 
f/,,.-4 
{ l/ 
\ i ~~':. 
Gvwd 
int:~llig,s-nce. B~1cause i11for:na tion on enemy ordnnnce is prime.rily iH-tB-f\C.f;d- fu-r-: 
•.,_ .. ,,_~ 
----•~L~. 
c.+-1 (,.;.',,( ...... 
design of U.S. ordnance, tho organization comes within the l\.,nenrch e, Develon-
' . 
wRc;,R, ,.i. 
-~~,nt· ~~ervie,::i under th,_, ·1 (->•.-ider<"hi·> nf Gi·'n•-~.,. .. _,·1 ;11"1"1 -·<.' \'he ·1r:ct-: ("1l"r off-Le~' 
. - "~  ,.A , , . _ ... ( ,.1 , , ._ ...... _ ,,._. ·' ·•.·· • _, - '·· -~· ·-~ -- - " 
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The For··:Jign Materiel Br!."~noh a.dviae~) t;J)e ·rnch11.L,:rtl 1nteli.iger1c-e Brn ..rtGh of 
the ar•ri,lal of the lt0m. Tl1ereupon, the TechniCE·.l I!lt':·lli~~·::nce Brnnch contact;; 
tho aµpro·µria te Developmdnt .uivisions in the Offict::, Chief of Ordn~:.nce nnd. 
~)r1-Jf)fares a cornpl;:te correlt1.ted directive for thE; test and eY~a11ination of "} 
thi.;.t item. Tt1is coordinu.tion ifi import.ant. i~s me.hy an three or four Divioions 
<~; 
rnay be interGsted in one it-sm of Hncmy ordnance.:: ::tn::l_ it is i1nportu.nt tho.t r:~s 
rnc.ch infor?na ti on as _possible bE: obtained 1'.rorn thr) r::;la ti vely limited rwo1.1n ts 
)) of enemy m:i teriel avail•cble ir: thin country. 
A firing progr::un cn1~ried out <-iccorn.in; to sacl1 a directive will <iv·e 
com?l8 ta inl'o!•:n~· tion concerning tJ:1e i t~~rn. If th-0 i t;.;irn should be ~\n nnti ti::.nk 
gun for ex.ample, th0 '.vei;;h t of the piece in firing pofli tion End in tr'.:.v~~lir:..~.~ 
no:3:l ti on '"ill be obtn.ined, the mu.: zle velocity, ballici tic limi tn of the 
projr:~cti.ler:-~ .fired, hop recorcls, mt:xi:nu~n minir;1ren 2levr. t:Lon r.nd tl'.~~.'l·~r;:et~, 
~~-.t~9 •.:..:tc. I.f ~:;xtrn. g11n t·J.b~::e .-·.r~? ~).vnil;-;bl1::, ~,h·:;~/ (.L!"S :-:;ent t .. ·:1 ~r·.~tt:1 rtor,·n 
;~rs,~~n 1 ~l for r:h~t~_·,_llLlI'f'..ic~~l 8xar:iinc,_tion. 'I'h!-; ::.~rsnn..'ll :.~lr.o conciucts m-.::tn.l.lurrri-
co 1· . .L ; ~·: .. ::, J.!.. ;:: : :)r·.: :'. -n :~r::::.:·:.~ .:l~· L':~. 
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·1nnt13h tv.rik;.s. nrn i\·ti::1:1.Labl1:s,. ~J-i~5:l_';_" ·,· .• 1;-1·.·t ,o: ... :.!,.~_·_,, ,f .. :·:i., Y:1P.n~_:(inH 1:rt 1~nt>.1r't.':i·n:,:1d .. 
This has been done v1ith respect to the Germn.n tA.k. II.L, IV FJ.nd Vl ta11ks. It 
iB now being done against tl1e Gerraan \lk V or 11 P:1nther 11 tr.·.nk. 
Small arms ammunition and cartridge ca:ces for all calibers ar9 sent to 
Frankford Arsenal. Ammunition is sent to Pica tinny Arsenal where chemical 
analyses are made of the explosive, prim8r and detonntor, etc. Complete 
working dravrings ere also raade of the compl ote round and ,,,,rticulerly of the (§) I . t I ... ' ' t " .,,J. • .\I' \ ~ •• "" \ ti,.-;· • '' '!' • ~ "' ' , ,,. • C '-~ ,c•.,. fuzes. /I) ~ ... ~t;;,./ ~·\ s .. _,,i,,. ,, ......... ? i i vCl .. ··F"·, ~{F.{,. ·) .(,· .. i:.t-i •. , ~-v """ ...,,~.,., '""'>i.'--~1r vV '~ - -....· , · '\ ,., / 'v··-~ 
· x·. /) c.,.. .• ,,, ,.+ ~~ , '1· · \ ~e..~-r~,...d~~~:... - J -...-~~:,~__.-t,.~ .. h '{ / ""'f~j,,..~~/'•\,::.·. 
Many metallurgical exmniaq cions of smaplen f m enemy ''lquiument are conj 
ducted by Ba ttalle Memorial Institute working under the auspices of the 'Yer 
Metallurgy Committee of the National Reseo.rch Council. Thene examinations 
are ;ic.rticularly concerned with methods of mnnufv.cturing and the une of 
alloys to deter1nine new n1ethodn o.f manufr.c~ure and th'2 possibl(:: e:xistence of 
shortHg•.::s in Anemy resources~ 
Fire control instrwn(::nts dr1::: Sf~nt to F'r-r· .. n1\:ford Rrsenal. 
,·,t the r~~q_tl.:~st of th(~ Orci.n<'nc·:: 11,rr,:L1:::nt-. t,{:E! ···nr :·n ·in•.:orini~ Joara 
.. " ':,L·· ' , _l ! : : ::c YlEl:l~.· .i_::: 
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fuc·1tl1r'.~~1 of en0my de~Ji[~n ·r-rt1ieh cliff er frorn U.S. deu:lgn nr1d which <ippear tq be 
v-1ortJ-1y of cars-ful examination arid teHt. The board hEs m2.r:e .?..rr~;ngerrient::; whereby 
th2se ite1ns so selected will be examined .by firras inanufact11ring comparable: 1J. S. 
1~u to:no t,:i. vu coillponon ts. 
The ex.tent o:f all ·t;h:Ls 1.'!0rk C(;.n best be appr·JCiG.ted by str1tin!'.-: that d11ring 
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t.hd U .. ;~ ._ .. 12cm t.tbrta.r. Mn.i1y f\-~atur•:-!B of th~-; Gerittfln rHng·.~finders hn .. vl.'~ bee:n 
·::mbo-.Jis~d in th(:) d<::J;~j.gn of U.,r3. rang,_~;:f.'i:nder;;;. 
iif'ter ~J examination,· the enem:;.r 01~ctn::ince -mfatariel is placed in t11e 
Foreign lifiu tericl 11useurn 'Nhicri is op~ra tGd by tho Forr:.~ign fvta teriel Brt:tnch. 
This 1nusellfil is visited by l1undreds of ~)erso11s each month ir1cl1lding tra::i.r1ees 
frojn the Ord11ance H.eplncement Tra.i11ing Center, Gnmp Meade, Fort Belvo.i.r, etc., 
and mor~J important, by officers flth:J. t-Jngin·2ers engaged in t11e Develo,~;ment of 
U.S. 1uatcri<:il .-:i.nd by •!!ngineers frorn :::irivi'l.te facilities w!10 are •sorking \Vith 
tl1e Ordnance Department. Freuuently iten1s whicl1 hnve been exarnined and \\'hich 
ht:vrJ been placed in the nru.seum n.r:~ 'ffi thctra·sn fro:n the mus.:.;um and given further 
tests vi'hen a ne 1N developrnent lJrojt::ct is !:1ssigneci to the Researcl1 and L'evelop-
mont Ser.,ric:;. f:t.S~-.a.n,. .. exarn.ple-,.- .. ~tll~~ Cerraan 50c:::u li10rtar Yin~J recently f:l.red to 
--.,_...., 
····---
det .. 3rmin•a the performarice ch~-~r::~ct:·~rictic0 of thc0 fuzes \';hen tl1:·:: {l-ri1I1unition 
? 
Develo;om,mt Division received a proj.;ct to develop a mortar fuze ·11ith delto.y /--.. 
<'/ .. )' 
ara1ing. // A 
'\ l / 
, I / 
\ "'""''·~~·,i1/'0 
\(\ i! /t, I l I /I ff \ \)\~'}->\)\,j}-\~.iJ 
l)'/ 
0 (/ft _,.--·~·"'-----/; 
So fn.r, l hn.v,~ not yet 1:1ontioned a third but vcr;/ L::1nDl't,:.~-:t ,J.f3C: ':~hich .ls 
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t:r·:-1 :in_~lflG 1u;,'!.nU.Ela,. eircu.ln,r";, bull,,;ti'ne u t<'r,. 'qt'hlcJt f;a"' d RJ:t'B<p:11.cx'a1.i' tc °t4"nin 
ll. ;J. combat troops in the usu of captured 0quipmen t. Copies of the re ports 
on aLl examinations are sup9li.1od to G-2 WDGS and to the agencies charged 
with the dissemination of such information. The Ordrance Department is not 
charged with the training of combat troops, but it is called upon to edit 
technically all the publications on enemy equipment which are distributed 
/ ;';,/ s l~:::."'l\J 7-
to the troops, 
!\ 
You will encounter great difficulties and porhaps considerable danger 
in recovering items of enemy ordnance and in shipping thcm1 to the United 
States. I hope that in telling you of the use made of this mr'.teriel h'ffe 




-' ;.,,:~ .. , -~-~-~"y~;.!M,:.::.~~·1:~,t;cefl 
are about to form a very vital part in the over.-all 
'" I . \.!~-"~·"'"'" (\y ,·p J •,. ·, I 
, ~-~~~-;·' \)~.f.,\,,,,, i-' · .. f>_r-,.. \j~,r-.,,l7·--,"1> 
\ ..... t.,..P .... \,/:·'. (~""1-' <1~-' ~\., .''· '~"" • l '· c- 1 ~,,,..-,_--• ... 'l, ,l:"~'..1;,,· _.~<~. _'-L .,V:····,iJ;t, 
I have already rnentiont:d th:-~t tests hc.ve been donducted t.o det.e3rmine the 
vulnerability of German tanks to U.S. antitank weapons. Such information, in 
,_~_d.:_t,ion to \)eing ·used by the dr~si5ners o:f' U .. S .. ordn~i.nce J:t::.:tsric·~l,. irJ very 
L· .. ~:.:.bl~ 
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COL01!F:L .; • fl. FH.!E 
at the 
A!IJNUJL ·;.rEr;rING OF 'TH.". SOCI.I:TY OF' AUTO::.GTIV:7• ;~:z~C'1I:LET.;RS 
DETitiJIT, :a CHIG;,1! 
10 JANU1\RY 1945 
im. C!L',H;.w,N, 'AI:.:;LBJms OF Tim .SOCIETY OF AUTO~:.(YfIVE r?1GINEEJ1S, LADIES AND 
'.:, 
Gml'l'LN.UiN: 
A nation 1 s 1;,bility to wage war can be mGLJ.sured by its capacity 
to produce and fabricate metals. History tells us that the Assyrian Arny 
was the first to be i'ully equipced with iron we~.}'ons (about 70) B.C.) and i: 
their Suzlerior arm.s made them invincible in conquering Babylon and Egypt. 
Caesar found the unciviliz.ed tribes of Briton using iron bars for currency, 
while raiding Norsemen prized iron cooking pots far ;01ore thi:n gold. or jewels, 
In a broad sense, the value of iron and steel has not ch<:illged gr0atly, and . 
it is becaut>e of this nation 1 s great c"pacity to produce 1md .f2brico:te 
tremendous quantities of essentiaJ_ i~et:.lB that thet·e could be no doubt 
about the outcome of the war. The wide range of ruet1cln and rr,eLllurr;y 
that enters .Lnto (lUto;:'.otive m&teriel offers ''n excd.lcnt op~ortuni.ty to 
expand our knov1leci•c,e of the enemy through 11 metl:J.lur;,;ic1:l study of their 
vehicles. 
At tho outn.':t of the w1 r, the Orw11,nco Dep1ert:;::nt rcco.;nh:ed ( 
the imnort'1!1ce of being f:::nil.L«r with ene:oy- materiel. Tecbnieal Intelligence 
l'ic.Ltl te~· ..... :~e. ;·rel' - ·.)r 
. ' ... , ,, ·- J ' !lCL .. ss_i<}10n tc our :.:.r1:~icn \:,;.' ,:·.CCO. E:1:::t t:1e;-;: :.n 
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to r-n .,,..,. p'.l"0<>1' t.101•t » md. M'""'l4!'!11 1'11.i.s e'l<ptu.N>tl -t•<>'"i!lltl.. t>1>1!' ~~ 
/,"' 
stu<.Ues. The wbol.e ia superv.1.sed and eoordinated by the 'l.'eehniea1. Int 
Branch• Research and, Materials Division. Over 1400 dii"ferent types of en111l17 
weaPQns, ammunition and automotive vehicles have been received and examined. 
Germany has been actively engaged in technical intelligenee work 
since the beginning of the war, but the Japanese have been short.sighted in 
this respect. 
German weapons are good and are being constantl.y improved,. 
indicative of the generall.y accepted opinion of German ingenuity and 
engineering ability-. In general, they represent good engineering and 
design princ:l.ples. On the other hand, Japan has been accumulating stock 
piles of finished war materiel for the past ten or fifteen years. Much of 
this equipm.ent was ma.de in foreign. countries, notably Ger1nany, while that 
made in Japan was normally produced accord.lug to standards and designs which 
were· acceptable at the time of their construction. The Japanese have not 
demonstrated automotive and metallurg:l.cal engineering ability and ingenuity 
beyond that which 'll'OUld be commonly expected of them. A review of the enemy 
availability and supply situation, in regard to the principal engineering •; 
materials, will assist in evaluating their existing metallurgical practices, 
and possibly in foreseeing future changes. 
Of all materials, steel is perhaps most essential cmd m;ed in 
the grco11test volume. The Germwi steel industry is second only to thi:.t 
of the United States, with an annual capacity of nearly thirty million ingot 
tons. At the height of her military successes there -,,,as a potentic,l capacity, 
includ:i.ng tl1;:~t of occupied cou11tries, o.f over fift~f ,:i_:C.lion tons, but it, is 
unlikely thc.t !:lli!i tonnage w:w ever re:lcbed. ~: !_nc~-- th:.t t.i e, the :iroduction 
-2-
I l . 
! 
I 
f, 'i i \, 










·11 :.1.1 ! 
'i 1' ~ 
. I , , 








'I! . !.,. ,, 
·;;\}" 
'. ~1;-; ;;f\"fj,\'/'.j,) 1.;. ~; 
;·. ;· r<·-~,,.r ~ J,?Jh~ 
0·'\ 
•' ' 




.::; ! ':'.i 
·,::::.·.r n_'.'.~I (;-, .. 
,· ,·- .,. ,,,_----:.··.:··.c-:,::···· ··"'.>::cY;''.'>l'!;,'Jifff: _ ... ,_,~··s:·- ·:·.· ''· ·'.;·-,--:: >_o 
ff.~~.,, ~~*"'··~,,.~~< : ·.·· .· ...... : > / 
... ····~ll····~?J~.··~~~·~~>~vatJ.aoi<1···¥tir,~t~·Gs:~f~;i.~~~.:~~ .. ~.~~;~!~ ... ~1~~~~~~~: .. 
. Ne.a;r].y't.wQ-third$ ot t.he German st~ei ~rdduCtion ~~ac{ty H1.ui'tnthe m:ifu.'+•:: . 
·_: - : _' - -_ :·. ·: :.-----,--. _ , - . . _ . _. ,,-.. :-----. _>-. :··:. ·, :_,._:_--'..::·.:,h·.:??~'.:::\l?'.·_;~::·z~-:-}\(_{~: _;i_':h -C':'!'_.:::_?,~;(_'i>:~-'.:_\'.J'.;:_;;:~'(:\::.·~_·f::_-\::_:.:~:::.---•,i;'. ::-:-.';).~(_::fr~}',i:~~{;·;:~-~~·:·:: ·:;·;·:. ~: _-:,,: 
.. Vdle;r iind appro:rlmatel;r la;t; in the $a~.,c·· J.1.t.ti(iugl:i ll~~i\$ a ail.di:~ .. ,,;.,.1:.1S 
,. -- ''"<· -> - - - - --<· __ :> -,.·; ... '.~ __ :,~<>::'.:,::·'.-·'----'·:·_.-._·::· __ ·: -.--:·.-"··:: , _____ ,_, __ ,_-""-.<·,:_._.·:·_--, · "-:·-;· .. ::;·:)wzr~i:~; ~\~;\~~si~fti 
produet:i.on or m.angiuuu;e, there Clln be little doubt that .. a CQl'ud.derabl;· ::;·•· ''1:/I 
. ··s;\;~: 
.stockpile or ore ha.iJ been created through th• operation or t.he Nittapol lllinee:. 
· .1'he Bal.kane have provided large quantities of essential alloying ores, ~d: 
their l.osa, snd those er other liberated CO\Ultries1 will unquestionably:\ .12,' 
-;~;~);''>/:.' 
require some adjustments in her steel making practices, although ag~in it 
.ijj 
·1 
may be Clllq>ected that larg• stockpiles have beM created. 
Copper is the most critical metal to the German war economy. 
This is emphasized by the confiscation of electrical lines, church bells,. 
• ·.• !!'. •.··•.· !' I?< \I 
et.atnes, utensils, boilers .and pipes t.hroughout Germany and occupied nations. ,:,: I~: If 
and the ext.enaive substitution that has been practiced. Uagnesil.litl is avaU.able 1•;, j 
.. :·· . ,. : ~ 
in abundllnt quantities and there is :sufficient refining capacity for aluminum. ~J ... j'i 
to provide 2001 000 tons above requirements. This excess can be substituted 
for copper and other metals of less favorable availability. 
'l'> evaluate the Qermmmaterial situation, consideration must be 
given to the stock:pilos of basic materials and scrap which were confiscated 
from occupied countries. Also, large q_uantiti.es of' t.anks, guns and other 
f'-' 
materiel were captured and, while a few of such items were accepted and used, 
,-v;;; such as the Czech 3S tank chassis r..nd the Polish 7.92 rom gun, this capt.ured 
' !llateriel served principaD.y as itnportwit. mines for ferrous and non-ferrous 
materials.. The prewar materiel of' most countries was made without aubstitut.ion 
o:r mater:l.el restrictions, and the use ol' nickel up to 5%, molybde.nu.11 ti;·; to .5%, 
i:if ' ~<r·, ~· 
• :<:-· .. • :)< • 1 f ;f~·. ii 
" I i•' 
f:·._ ~ 
I ' / ·I 
· .. [ \. II ~- '· ~: ! 
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--,nJ 2c1::;;;J 
Xr.~· f p;;~;,i!t.ft (J :2lJA!/.'l!ifh }T:'o-J~S~ ~l 
.h.t<J-(fflC$~:f1~7J' ·c-;;b.\:TC'f P-':'\ '.ffQtI 1'.':G f·}lt~ 
~-:c:·;r~.j'.&. .h'}/J)···f)J'._rA.q·u i::rt fi-JG 
•. ~J(.r .. IP '1.J b.t.i.'?l}Gi1 f.' 'l::-J\~S:.fT~":tfYT f~ ~un 
",Y '2 ~ib-;:J'.Lb.?4~1:\'l~i.~1:\:r?· • .f ;;~~~sg-::\-t.TAG "-:ffTTTOJJ' t<n.xrf..; ' 
,c·.:-; < \ -:'':;::·:: '.J ·,'. :c· .. ·.- ·:·., -< , · .. _ ·. , . ·-.·:-·<." , , , .-:---· .... ,_,. , :-·: .. ,..·:· ., ·::·,:-.::;;_,<':-->·}"'; <>,_,:-.·>".-.' '·'< <·.'•' '. >':>:···-: ·::· ··: 
al~ ~ .. ~r nmt-;t°.it;l!'rOQ Mtll'l.lrl· ~ '$\~ at ftli'tl:n&\lf~" 
&•n·m~ ..iv~e orgM.i.~~tian l'igidl;'emroJ'C~J ~gaticn and the utiJ.izati9tl1J 
oJ: ~h~.~"rlal.s t.o. the !'ullest e:otbent. 
There aan be n.:. doubt that Gemany f'\1.1.l.S" recognized her short.-c.omings 
in raw, ma:teriab and by various means has so :hr circumvented this disadvant'.a.i¢e. 
~>:+, .,.,.,. 
Chromium, silicon and manganese were h~r most. avirl.lable ferro--a.lloying elements 
so considerable technical work wl!>s done to develop suitable 4teel chemistries., 
'l'he Japanese lllaterial situation is quite different froo that of the 
Germans. ilthaugh Japan h.'1s conquered territories extre11'ely rich in minerals 
and other basic materials, she is very vulnerable through shipping hazin"t'.ls .. 
However,. a stockpiling program wics initiated in the early 1930•11 and deficient 
materials. were purchased in great quantities. Simultaneously, an industrial 
program was inaugurated, and mining and lll!\llui'.actur:Lng c11pacities nthl.n the 
inner zone were developed to the maximum e:id;ent. No doubt Jap1m was aware 
that a long term development in the conquered southern areas could not be 
accomplished, and she concentrated on obtctining tile quick assets of essential 
·products. Japanese induatrial. strength ll.es in the Nort.h, but they have had 
possession of the southern areas long m1ough to milk them of supplies. It 
would be unwise to assume tha;t ri>w matflrili.l requirements cannot be 01e·~ for 
considerable ti;:ie, It would seem more reasa..-iable to expect inadequate 
manufacturing <'J1d fabric~,ting faciliti0s for the production oi' WLr m&.tvriel. 
During 1942, Japan produced approx:il"..ately eleven ;ui.llion ingot tons 
or steel• and it is possible that this may have been increased 25% during 191+4• 
~'Vitl1 the exceptior1 of son;e alloying eleruents:t ba.sic ;natcrial3 for steel .:~u: .. king 
n.re ::.:.v;::.il.nble. M.nny of t.he neces~,.-,r;-"' f.'er1"'0-alloyj_ng elen1ent~; and non-ferroas 
ietet;,ls, except <J.lunlinum and magnesim1, wlll prove extremely critic,·.l as CJt:!Ck-
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COl<t~~\l;r, -· flit *fU' ···~ 
pr<>Jll.mt m:~al.lID!'gi<mJ, oop;>bilit.i..iu11,. >~ <tf •._~~~ ~flt~:!..,. ~.~ ~~· 
ot .bi~:t'i~an or .at.hflr foreign desiglla: la ~ ~~~' t~e .fa~(i.-~/2 Mt 
cargo troCk· is al.most ru.1 exe.ct copy of the 1939 ChevroJ;et, and, lnsoi'ar 
as practicable .. they have copied the metallurgical practices, as well as 
design principles. .A table of chemistries and treatments of some components 
of this vehicle are included in the paper, but they are not of sufficient 
interest t.o spend time on this a!temoon. 
Instead, we have 110;;1e slides thiit show some of the more int.eresting 
data of' Gemiam Vehicles. 
(SLIDE 4) 
This slide shows a portion o.f the German constructional steel 
specifications. These specifications were tranalated from a German materials 
handbook published at Essen in 1943, whose foreword naively stated "Jill 
translations into enemy_ languages are prohibited." The first group, DIN 1611-A• 
has no chemistry requirements. There is an error in the caption or Steel B; 
instead of reading "Carbon content not fixed by purchaeer," it should read 
n0n1y carbon content is fixed by purchaser." There are four principal types 
of earburizing steels: straight carbon, MN-CR, Clt-MO, and CR-NI. The 
nickel compositions have not been trned in automotive vehicles, ap~:Rrentl7 
being reserved for aircF\ft and other very speciu.l needs. 
(SLIDE 5) 
The next slide shows the medium carbon grades of this specific?..ticn, 
and the sa:r:e ;;enorHl pattern ey.ists. There is one :r":m,:vme.:;e-silicon grade, 
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• ...• > '~Ji~-;~~ ~~;;·~;~·~!;~··"":a~. ~*!.!.~,, ~. '·"" 8 
..md, .t..i 1J.. l.11t1mq .1;!::d.lll'.lt.* c~&ilicon typ""• in<ti<l,,t:!.ng 'Im Uli<ir<.,..ing a 
' _:-'.'-.'>ff' 
poslJ.~le ahortage ot 11101.ybciem.un. .. 
(SL!DE 6) 
Thill s:J.ida 1>hO'lls the mainshaft sub-assembly of the German 
Th.is was the lllUCh advertised "People• s C<ir" which Hitler promised to 
every garage. 'l'he main shaft is made from steel comparable with 
quenched md tempereci to Re 49 - 52. The spur gears are .38 C chrome-m.olybdroUll\.' 
steel nruilar to 4140 except low manganese. These gears were case hardened to 
a depth o! ..oosn. The case hardness was Re 64 and core 49. 
(SLIDE 7} 
The upper left m:J.crogra.ph shows the structure of the mainshuft. 
It appears to have been (;"Uenched out and tempered a.t a low temperature. 
The right micrograph shows the core stntcture of ths smaller spur gear. 
Contains martensite with some bainite. The ease is the lower figure. 
(SLIDE 8) 
All of the important ge:>.rs in the Volkswagen were ease hardened, 
and the more highly stressed ones were ~tedirnn carbon chrome molybdenum 
steels. This table sUllllnarizes the eszential gear pr,,.ctiee in the vehicle. 
'l'he high c1:1se and core hardness valves are notev;orthy ~<s are some of the 
case depths. The carburizing of medium carbon steel ge."rs and development 
of nigh case and core hardness values are .i.n kee: inct with the thinking of 
our automotive metallurgists, but the Cllrbon content and tho coro hardneos 
·in this vehicle are so•t•ewhat higher. Tte spli.ne shaft .<ind driving pine.on 
ancl t1~'3 r-~Hi~ict'Lon :;e:~r \1re the on .. ~.;; 1Di'- -:~. :·b~:·n .:>.l.l.o,J r:itc·::l ;._~e._.rn in t.be 
~;rou·p., Th.e tii.~ring ge"-~l'· is rte~dc fr~;: ·;.1 ~r ':. :J~'. in1.,5 ~n1d L:·,.::: a. • 01.,on 
case. iloto trmt all but l;wo of t'nc;:·e ; • . "' .,,.... -:.de fr·o;; chrorr.e-:l\olyb<J.enum 
:·.;r .. t. ... _ :-~c: ')f th::! ':71<1J~Ge.s C'~~:-: 
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J:~ ftg, m!<l).hin(!J<"l r:r- ·~ - p:f.cte• tor~\$ imd ~l.rt.1«< 
h!i.Menli!4 e the tbt'O\lls to a. h1u·~eaa <:1l !¢.··~ .. 'S8. 'llh1le t.he un.~ .. ct 
. - ·- - ' ' ' 
portions ll.~(i a h.i.r•it'l.'!se of Re ~:3 - ·:n. It i:. <ID excellent !orging job, 
but. t.bAI indu.ct.1<:¥1 l:w.rdened arena do penetrate the radii on the thl'O'lra. 
Alao> llOOie of. the ra.dii 1i.i•e inclined to be &harp., 
(SLIDE 10) 
'i'h111 slide showa the cam 11hatt or t.he Volkswag.n. It 111 a 
grey irM casting whose bearing Blll'fa.ces were f'lllllile barde11ed. Flame 
hardening produces too f"ur.z;r appearanoe a.t. the bottOlll 0£ the hardMed 
areai11 whereas induction hardening generally leaves a sharp line of 
demaroation. The ~ened areas had a Rockwell C hardness of 47 - 4$ and 
tbe etrueture was ~ne.'ltiall;y o! white iron. The shaft was a norowl grl.l'J 
iron with a Rockwell C of 15 - 22. 
(SLIDE U) 
This ii a driving pinion and spline shaft sub-i•11ser4bly, and 
of intsrost from the de:oigu as well as the aietoJ .. btrgical point. of view. 
Roller:; are Ufi(•tl Ml :spll.rws. Made i'rom Ciet':r,J.n VC Mc l.25, lih'leh is aildlur 
to $1,E 4125• these rollers were <rnrb11rized .020~ Mel have l1 Cl'l~>e hm•J.nes~ of 
Re 60 - 65, and n. core hardnu:~s of f;c 38. !he spline <1b,..f't and c1.t:LVing 
pinion is low cnrl>on, mangimese-chroo;;e-~iolybtlenum steel, Gerrc<>n ,;:. ;,_0 l0·:.1, 
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wbl.4h .. ~ ~~~~·~ ~;~JL 
and the core of ll.C: 26. l'IO't<> t.h .. 
;;: 
of h<lii:i4'al ~ears. 
(SLIDE 12) 
~J<>t? ~ 
These are mierographs sbow:i.ng the structure of the i•ear axle 
shaft. The top micrograph shows that of the forged tongue, while the 
bottom shows the structure of the shaft pra;;er. This shaft is made 
frora medium carbon elu-ome-molybdenum bar st.eel which had been hot upset on 
one end.. The shaft was gradiantly quenched, obtaining a. hardness of 
Re 28 - 34 on the shaft and 45 - 48 on the tongue. It appears that the 
ccoling rate was not rapid enough to obtain the optimum hardening. 
(SLIDE 13} 
_, TM.s eross sf!ction of t,he tt'a.n!lmo;.\•ion emie is one of the 
most interN;t:' ng non-ferr<:>us parts 1.:1 the Volkswazen. It :ls 11. s'•nd cast 
magne~inm i..lloy of ra.th~r intr1c:,i.te der;ign, a.nd unusually free from 
poros:ity and other defects. The ca.st.in;; W·''.S ir\.'Ten a dichroma.te tres.tment 
to inhibii~ c@rros1.on. There were ~ever-1.'1 ot'mr cw.gnnsinm parts in this 
vehicle includ1.ng the c'"'" ffhaft timing gear. 
(SLIDE 14) 
The Gemwn 8 ton half track pri.;:ie mover and personnel carrier, 
is one cf the principal prb;e movers o'f the Ger:>.:a.n Ari~y, and is extremely 
important to mobile war.fare. The Germans des:lgnate half tracks by their 
towl.ng capacity, hence the name of 8 ton. This vehicle is actually three-
·;ua.rt"r track. There are na.ny interesting inetallurr;ical features. Th'i. ,3 
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tfaiv~r$.!il l'Of'.l.i~\@. t~.-«•-.W'1~.-'~. ~ :ir'1!.~~ ~··~· 
mofybdemua carbutl~~~g g~d.1-~ •· .ri ~ri:~~~"ti.li ~H.-~1~ ~-t!'ulse' ,;:;· 
in,,Lance" low carbon steels were used•. 30 carbon being the maximum. High 
case hardness values con·~inue, although only the universal 1Wline and· 
transmission gea.r have relatively high core hardness values. 
In most other components the steel ehalllistries followed those found 
in the 'folltawageu. but sever1"1 nickel alloys were used. The main soort. 
is ma.de tro:a Krupp analysis Md is believed that t:.he alloy content is 
higher than needed. It has a DI factor of about 9. which can be met 
with lltUCh lower alloy. such as GertJ1.an VC 11-0 2,40. lt is believed that 
this case is an 00<:ception, and this analysis was used i:;s a matter ot 
expediency> perhaps to utilize confiscate<:! or diverted steel. 
(SLIDE 15) 
This slide show::: the half trnck cranlcshart. It is made from 
chrotne molybdenum steel to which about l/2$ nickel wtL:il added. 
(SLIDE 16) 
This shows a macrograph of No. 3 and Mo. 4 throws. A considernble 
2mount of' machlne work is indicated by the cutting of the forgJ.n;; flow lines. 
The excellence of the induction hardeninf! of the bearing a:rt,o;,us cm be noted. 
In thi:s crc.nksiiaft the fillets are well formed and in no inste;nce do the hardened 
areas enter into the fillets. The hardness or the throws was Re 53 while that 
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tracli::• _::tt :was made troi11 Geiman IC Ko 100 lll:tt11ti ts la -~ 
molybdenum type, and is a good illustr,,.tion of German .t'orgi:l:lg pr&ctiee. 
(SLIDE 18) 
;This ~Jjd~ shows Ii macrogr:;.ph. of hhe teeth of the reverse 
slidi.ng ge<.r. The case depth was appro:xilr"3.tely .020" and had a 
Rockwell C of 61 with the core hardness of Ro 38. 
(SLIDE 19) 
A Gel'!>an vehicle of the heavy duty type which waa made a year 
or tlo later than the half tr11ck has been metallurgically m.irveyed. 
Thia slide shows No. 3 and 4 ·throws oi' the erankzhaft of thia 
vehicle. It will be noted t.hat the hardened areas have not been carried ,, 
,,,,.,: 
into the 1'1llets. This crMkshart was made essentially !rom SAE 1345 steel# 
With small additions or chrome .14% and vanadium .oJ:J,. The crankshaft is 
rather large in diameter &nd operates in roller bearings. 
(SLIDE 20) 
The intake v::..1ve$ are i;:r:.dv f'ro~~1 ir..eriitu:i cr.rbon, loY;r nick:el~ 
hig·!1 cl1rcuuiw.r1. st~eei., W.1d t.he 1-1;1 2~-0 chroJniUlil ae~:n1.s· so;;:.ev1r~at h:i.gl1e:·r than 
neees,:,.::-..:r,y. Tl'!e e=r..ilaust vl;W:ves si10Ml here ~l~(~ .ade by d1--ill:i.ng r:. l:">i:~r 
and hot ups<»~Ling the (;'!ld. The G:.tvity is filled ·::itb sodiu;;:, through 
the hole in tho head, wki.ch iG la~cr "'".led w"lth lS-8 ·Neld:l.ng rod. It 












'(1 ~\ 'Q'{f~.·l~·i:· f)~}·f•r"'-tf ''(t'l'.'· -rJ0x1r: 'r. ·t,4-~~i·-/;/ ':'>y-·-vrr•'-·Jil~· ¥lL\\:-.i-.'.1·.. 1~i~· ~t-- c..,..·,...·~r 
", .. ,,;.: .. '-·:;\~.·",(' i,,·'f-·1"~' .. '" ,>f·,-·!""··'·'f'~·;t, ':.j.,<;-.,f,;J.~~;,",.l,,,N·, "· -'•• t.:( •J.'.', 
. 'tbi~ .:U.<:te i .. 
tihart.. and it< iit<i;.b~restitig. 'beew.se of' t.he procesi!l:\ng 111:et.hGd ue<eo.. 
mainehaft. ia .,ll) earbon man1;aneee atee1 Gimilar. to SAE 1036 and the 
cl.i/~~li geiir 1'r01ll a .44 ea:rbon chrome mangarieae l!lteel 1'or$ing. 
JU<!Chining, t.he two ar@ W<illded. to for;:i an integral unit. 
plete pent1~r11tion thro11<ih ~he weld joint has not been r~btidned, it 
':> 
appears toot the weld area lm..11 sufficient strength to meet stress re-
quirements. 
(Sl...IDE 22) 
. This $lide shows a hetl.VY lltity trimsmissirm ge••r. It is or 
interest l&:rgely b~,ca=e of the bol.t.ed type of co;istruction imd t.he 
large nmnber o:t bolts wM.eh l\sve boen uef:d. 
(SLIDE 2.:3} 
This sliae shITT1;o a. macro;;r2.ph of "' trans:nis:sion ge.;.r she:ft 
and is illust;r;.rti ve of Uor~i:•an i),r;.~:i.rt~C{ pi~:-J.cti'c(,. 
(SLIDE 44) 
This sli<ie shows a sUJ;U1«117 of tlw coaroositlon and. hsat trea~ 
raent of some of the vrii1ci;:u.J .. ,;eur:.. in a. hor.v:r duty ong:L1:c and trc,ns- ' 
.mission.. The carbon content :ls generally that of nortwl carburizing 
.,,_:,-
quality; there h~s bet::n no ruolybdenurn. ·tt;t}J0 o:f st.eels used, ond h.igl1 case 
hardnc:.:·s vn .. lues u:~~ \:.he t£GrH:irul rule. 'fh($ t.iin.1ng ,-:·2~~1· !1,-:_,n been nitri<le<l. 
The st~rt~!r geJ-.Lr b~~s cl. lov.- rui.r·dnes::;. The ;,...bnic:.0nce of :~.ol:rbde11tL'\l ,;'J.ll] 
indicate th;.t conservation WhS ;·~quired sihco the ti:;11e of production of 
the Volkswagen and hal.f track. 
(SLIDE 25) 
This is the hardenability curve br,cec on st<mcLrd Jo;11iny tesb 
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f.fuoh 11. . s been written of.' the ftne work done by Ordmmoe tntel.iigenoe 
repreeent&M.vee in e.ll the Theatere of' War. They aceornpHahed their mieaion 
aga:lnst al.l adverl'!lties and a~ Colonel s. B. R:l.tch:te, Chief of Research and 
Materials Division ate.tad "They were the Eyes and the Ears of the Office of 
the Chief of Ordnance." 
These Ordnance men went right up to the front lines, worked vith 
the combat troops, adve.nced with them, and suffered the same hardships as 
the front line soldiers. 
The significance of their achievements is ind1.cat .. d °bs' the vnRt 
quantity of captured enemy materiel eent, back to this country for examtne.tion 
e.nd analysis. Although the totul tonnage is not e:rn.ctly known, we ma.y esti-
mate th<tt approx1.mately l00,000 tonl!I .,.ere recei.veil in thil' country. This 
materiel included everythl.ng from the smallest piece of captured Enemy 
Ordnance up to the huge 21lc111 K-5(E) "Anzio ~nnj_.,., vrh1ch fires pro,1ectiles 
up to 53 miles in range, 
Most of the new types of enemy materiel located •·mre gener'llly 
found in the front lines or BO fnr forward thRt it waa impoeRible, sometimes, 
for great periods of time, to recover it for immediate shipment to this 
country. This occasioned them!I speci~.lly trained Ordn1tnce men to ex.amine the 
materiel on the apot, often under fire and to find the lntest data for 
transmission back. 
Information obtained from the gr'''" t volume of both prel.tmin11.ry and 
final reports played an important role in enabli.ng the Uni tad States to 
m'1.int1.1.in its advant~ge in the flghti ng tools the Ordnance Dep.9.r'cment provided 
for the Allied forces. 
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~tM•, t,~i11'11 t:'~~-.+l.tt,i~~:;_.,;·1;~i,~ 
th" tr<l•> !)Ill in th• tt<1''14 •. 'l:nq <ti" ll'f'm-1t.h1~~~!~t211t 
the 91Ystery .out of the en.,m:r mJaPQns by 111xplai11tng ad t.rd.n!Ag t1w 
in their use and me~.h~.n1"m to notually a.ct.1.ng as bomb dbposnl -n, def'udng 
and detonating dange:.·ou>ily l.ocated raieailes which aome times c:ontain"d new 
type fuzes that had never bean Be<ln or he11rd of before including anti-disturbance 
type. 
The following excerpts taken from A.otivit1es Reports present a. 
brief aurnmary of the iuvaluable work donci lJy the Ore.Inanes intelligence 
repre2antatlves, a great. portion of which wu done in addition to their 
assigned mission. 
a.. One report from Firllt Army in Ovember of 1944 states "D1lring 
this period, member8 of the 1Jni t ooopera ted ·1n th the Ordnance S ectton 1.n 
the obtaining of approximately 50 - 10.5cm le,F,H. lfl/40 howitzers, Thia 
involved a trip by the Ordnana .. intelligence artillery officer to Fa1aiae 
in order to supervise canmdlizt>.tlon and evacuation of these to CommunicG.tlon 
Zone in Paris. The OrC!nnnoe Intelligence mnmuni.tion off·i.cer durtm; the ~am" 
periocl inv{~ntoried vc1.r·tol1S E)namy amm'l.lni ti on dumpn for n.rJr~un:L t1.on. T}H~ gi.1n!-' 1•nd 
ammunition are to bo used b;:r Ft.rat Army units in order to con:~erve U .I!, 
Orc'.nance equipn•0nt aa much as poar.l:l ble tn ft,rthco,,ing coper~. U.ons." 
b. Colonel Toftoy, in reporting on th<'> f1ctl vi ty for one peri.od 
Rtates that in one 24 hour pflriod 1 our troops had fired over 10,000 rounds 
of r.erman l05mm anununi tion which Jn hia opi.nion may have been gre<\tly 
accredited to the 11 on-the-a pot" field work of the Technical Intelligence te•.ml!. 
c, In the Pncific, thee«" te'ims p<~rformed vo..ri.ed and 11m1:'tnl t<J.ska 
above 'llld beyord th'1ir nor:n,tl rospon:1lbilitien and of the oripinal ;;ro'.ips of 
five officer,; ;trui ~on ::"m :wnt to the l'·'lCific 1 J officer'' and 4 enlisted :nen 
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In one part1.cul&r :l.nr,1tanca, on Luz"n• J'a;i rookat11 ll'ere ~ing t'ir.-"d 
at our men fo,r the first time. T;1e un:familihr sound and fln.shes cre@.ted, 
resulted in an umiaual increase in hospitalized tnl",Jlfal c:>sas ·'lmong our 
troops. However, after so:ne of the rocket lAunching sights with equi,,;nnent 
were captured, the Technical Intelligence ofi'l.cer ·11ith that division trained 
a few crews of our men in the uso of the captured rockets and began to f:l.re 
them back s.t tha Japs. Thia action and applio11.tion of first-hand knowledge 
of Japane9e weapons caused the mental caaea of our men to drop appreciably 
and the officer waa reoogni.:ed by th@ divis:ton for hia work in be'lng aw'lrded 
the Brom:e:l:ltar. 
Anotlwr officer during the battle of Leyte in the Philippines 
compiled ranga tablas froiro «ctaal firing of Japanese mortar lllllmuni ti on in 
our own mortars and :;.s &. dir0ct result of thla work, over 5500 rounds of 
Japanese raorthr ammuui tlon mre utilized b one week to augment our 01/ll critic"l 
supply. 
Many other true incl.dents could be .sighted with regards to this 
small group of ''Eyes & Ears of the Ordnance Departm•mt" who sta.rted out tu 
the latter part of 1942 to be our Ordnance field investigators for acquiring 
exact technical iufol"lnation in keeping abreast of enemy develop:nentB. 
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